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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Essays on Liquidity, Informational Frictions, and Monetary Policy 
by 
Kee Youn Kang 
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 
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Professor Stephen Williamson, Chair 
 
 The dissertation, which consists of two chapters, is devoted to exploring the role of 
informational friction in monetary economics and finance. 
 
Chapter Ⅰ: COUNTERFEITING, SCREENING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY.  
In this chapter, I construct a search theoretic model of money in which counterfeit money can be 
produced at a cost but agents can screen for fake money also at a cost. Counterfeiting can occur 
in equilibrium when both costs and the inflation rate are sufficiently low. Optimal monetary 
policy is the Friedman rule. However, the rationale for the Friedman rule in an economy with the 
circulation of counterfeit money differs from the conventional mechanism that holds in the 
model when counterfeiting does not occur. I also study optimal anti-counterfeiting policy that 
determines the counterfeiting cost and the screening cost. 
 
vi 
 
Chapter Ⅱ: CENTRAL BANK PURCHASES OF PRIVATE ASSETS: AN EVALUATION 
In this chapter, I develop a model of asset exchange and monetary policy, augmented to 
incorporate a housing market and a frictional financial market. Homeowners take out mortgages 
with banks using their residential properties as collateral to finance consumption. Banks use 
mortgages and government liabilities as collateral to secure deposit contracts, but they have an 
incentive to fake the quality of mortgages at a cost. Quantitative easing (QE) in the form of 
central bank purchases of mortgages from private banks has effects on the composition of assets 
in the economy, and on the incentive structure of the private sector. When the incentive problem 
is severe, the central bank can unambiguously improve welfare by purchasing mortgages. 
However, when it is not severe, the central bank's mortgage purchases cause a housing 
construction boom and sometimes can lower exchange in the economy, hence reducing welfare. 
 
Chapter 1
Counterfeiting, Screening and Govern-
ment Policy
1.1 Introduction
Counterfeiting of money is centuries old problem and has been one of major issues that
monetary authority must deal with. In spite of its importance, there is relatively small
literature that studies counterfeiting in a general equilibrium model. Furthermore, quite
often in previous studies, counterfeiting works as a threat and does exist in equilibrium. Thus,
the following questions still need to be addressed: Under what conditions does counterfeit
money exist as an equilibrium outcome? How does counterfeiting, or its potential threat,
distort economic agents’ behavior and the allocation of resources? Is it optimal to eradicate
counterfeiting? How does monetary policy affect counterfeiting activity?
We address these questions by developing a monetary search model, building on Lagos
and Wright (2005) framework, in which counterfeiting can occur as an equilibrium outcome.
In the model economy, an asset is necessary for an exchange to take place, and the only
asset is fiat money supplied by the government. To study counterfeiting, we first introduce
costly counterfeiting into the model: Agents can produce fake money at a cost that is
indistinguishable from genuine money. The previous work on counterfeiting, such as Nosal
and Wallace (2007) and Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) among others, has typically focused
on the counterfeiting incentive with this costly counterfeiting technology. In this paper,
we take a step forward and incorporate costly counterfeit detection through screening as an
additional ingredient of a theory of counterfeiting. By considering these conflicting incentives
together, we provide new insights that counterfeiting can occur in equilibrium in contrast
1
to Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) despite using similar equilibrium concepts and economic
environments.1
More precisely, the model shows that counterfeiting occurs if and only if there is screening
activity. The intuition for this result is as follows. If an agent produces counterfeits for
exchanges and money is not screened, the agent can always find a profitable deviation that
prevents counterfeiting from taking place by reducing the quantity of the money transfer.2
However, preventing counterfeiting by restricting the money transfer is costly because it
limits the volume of exchanges. Screening can relax this constraint on the money transfer
and the trade volume increases, but for an agent to find it optimal to screen, there must be
some counterfeits in the economy.
Equilibrium can be one of three types: no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium, threat of
counterfeiting equilibrium, and counterfeiting equilibrium. First, in the no threat of counter-
feiting equilibrium, the counterfeiting cost is so high that there is no incentive to produce
fake money. Thus, economic activities are the same as in an economy where counterfeiting is
not a possibility. Second, in the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium, the counterfeiting cost is
not too high but the screening cost is relatively high, so no agents screen money in a trade to
check its authenticity. Therefore, counterfeits do not exist in this equilibrium. However, the
counterfeiting cost matters for real allocations because it restricts the volume of exchange,
as in Li and Rocheteau (2011), Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012), and Shao (2014). Finally,
when both the counterfeiting cost and the screening cost are sufficiently low, the economy is
in the counterfeiting equilibrium where both counterfeiting and screening occur, so genuine
and counterfeit monies coexist.
In the last two equilibria, counterfeiting, or the threat of counterfeiting, generates a
distortion in the allocation. First, the quantity traded is inefficiently small in the threat of
1In their extension, Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) make contracts incomplete and derive counterfeiting
in equilibrium. In particular, they assume that the shock on the counterfeiting cost is realized after the offers
have been made, so the offers cannot be contingent on specific types of agents.
2This is why it was difficult to generate counterfeiting in equilibrium in previous models that studied
counterfeiting without a screening decision.
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counterfeiting equilibrium because of the restriction on the money transfer. Second, in the
counterfeiting equilibrium, the counterfeiting probability decreases with the quantity traded
as a result of the strategic behavior of agents, which implies that the marginal money transfer
for an additional unit of goods traded decreases as the trade volume increases. Because of
this pecuniary effect of increasing the trade volume, the quantity traded is larger in the
counterfeiting equilibrium than the one in the economy without counterfeiting possibility.
One of key messages of our analysis is that the inflation rate plays a critical role in
which equilibria exist, unless the counterfeiting cost is too high, and it is more likely that
counterfeits circulate in the economy with low inflation. In our model, the quantity of
goods that agents want to trade in a decentralized market decreases with inflation, and
the incentive to make counterfeit money increases as the trade volume rises. Thus, when
inflation is high enough, the quantity traded is so small that agents have no incentive to
produce bogus money (i.e., no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium). As inflation falls, agents
want to trade more goods, which raises the incentive to make counterfeits. However, if the
desired trade volume is not sufficiently large, then agents restrict the trade volume such that
counterfeiting is not optimal, and fake money does not exist in equilibrium (i.e., threat of
counterfeiting equilibrium). However, when inflation is sufficiently low, it is too costly to
prevent counterfeiting by restricting the trade volume because agents want to trade relatively
large amount of goods, so counterfeits circulate in the economy with screening activity to
achieve sufficient amount of trade (i.e., counterfeiting equilibrium). Surprisingly, lowering
the inflation rate in the counterfeiting equilibrium reduces counterfeiting activities because
of the strategic behavior of agents.
Finally, we extend the model to study optimal government policies: monetary and anti-
counterfeiting policies. Monetary policy determines the inflation rate through changing the
money supply. Anti-counterfeiting policy determines the counterfeiting environment, i.e., the
counterfeiting cost and the screening cost, by investing resources in counterfeit deterrence
measures, for example, embedding new security features into banknotes.
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One result of the welfare analysis is that welfare decreases with inflation, regardless of
counterfeit deterrence policy, while monetary policy has different effects on the economy,
depending on the counterfeiting environment. This directly implies that optimal monetary
policy is the Friedman rule, i.e., contracting the money supply at a rate equal to the agent’s
rate of time preference. In a standard money search model, the Friedman rule is optimal
because it corrects the monetary distortion and thus supports an efficient amount of trade
in the economy. This mechanism still works in our model as long as counterfeiting does
not occur in equilibrium. A novelty here is that the Friedman rule does not maximize the
trade surplus as in a standard Lagos and Wright (2005) model if counterfeits circulate in
the economy. Indeed, when the inflation rate is close to the rate of time preference in the
counterfeiting equilibrium, the trade volume is inefficiently high and lowering the inflation
rate reduces the trade surplus. The rationale behind the Friedman rule here, is that it
minimizes counterfeiting activity and therefore also minimizes its welfare costs.
In addition to monotonicity, welfare increases discontinuously when the economy switches
from the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium to the counterfeiting equilibrium. This disconti-
nuity implies that if equilibria with and without counterfeiting are possible under the same
economic conditions, then welfare is higher in the economy with circulation of counterfeits
than without. This is because when both equilibria are possible, the quantity traded without
counterfeiting is too small.
For anti-counterfeiting policy, the model suggests that the government should focus on
improving only one dimension: either increasing the counterfeiting cost or reducing the
screening cost. This is because welfare depends on the counterfeiting cost in the threat of
counterfeiting equilibrium, while it depends on the screening cost only in the counterfeiting
equilibrium. Thus, any government efforts to improve one of counterfeiting environments–
the counterfeiting cost and screening cost–that does not matter for welfare are just waste
of resources. Further, because counterfeiting is more likely to occur when the counterfeiting
cost and the screening cost are both low, this result implies that it could be optimal for
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the government to tolerate some amount of counterfeit money in the economy especially
when the government can reduce the screening cost more effectively than increasing the
counterfeiting cost.
We are certainly not the first to study counterfeiting in the context of the New Mone-
tarist framework that specifies monetary arrangements explicitly.3 Kultti (1996) and Green
and Weber (1996) are earlier works that studied counterfeiting in the context of a monetary
search model with indivisible money. Williamson (2002) and Nosal and Wallace (2007) ex-
tended previous papers and showed that counterfeiting is only a threat that does not occur
in equilibrium, but such a threat could potentially lead to the collapse of a monetary equilib-
rium. Li and Rocheteau (2011) modify Nosal and Wallace (2007) and show that a monetary
equilibrium always exists, but the threat of counterfeiting affects the real allocation.4 Shao
(2014) extends the previous literature by using divisible money, and shows that the threat
of counterfeiting generates an endogenous resalability constraint under competitive price
posting. Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) introduce the threat of counterfeiting into a search
theoretic model of asset market to study its implication on liquidity and asset prices. In con-
trast to other papers, Monnet (2005) and Cavalcanti and Nosal (2011) adopt a mechanism
design approach to study the effects of a counterfeiting environment on allocations.
This paper contributes to the literature in three respects. First, our model goes beyond
earlier models by endogenizing verification efforts to detect counterfeits with a costly screen-
ing process instead of assuming fixed signals of the authenticity of money. Fung and Shao
(2016) take a costly verification technology that is similar to ours in spirit into account in
their model to endogenize detection efforts.5 However, they assume that sellers can either
3New Monetarist approach is surveyed in Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (forthcoming), Nosal and Ro-
cheteau (2011), and Williamson and Wright (2011).
4Nosal and Wallace (2007) assume that the seller’s belief that he faces a genuine money holder for any
offer is a probability equal to the fraction of genuine money holders among all buyers. This belief system is
more restrictive than is required by the Intuitive Criterion, which leads to miss some monetary equilibria,
and could give inconsistent results with the assumption that genuine money holders and counterfeiters make
the same offer in uninformed matches (see Li and Rocheteau, 2011, for more information).
5Quercioli and Smith (2015) also use a costly verification effort to study counterfeiting in a game-theoretic
model.
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invest in the verification technology or not, excluding stochastic investment decisions that
contributed to the non-existence problem of monetary equilibrium when the inflation rate
and the verification cost are sufficiently high. By allowing stochastic screening, we show that
monetary equilibrium always exists.
Second, in our model, both types of equilibria with and without counterfeiting exist mak-
ing it possible to study how economic factors, such as monetary and anti-counterfeiting
policies, affect a counterfeiting state in the economy. In contrast to our result, counterfeiting
does not occur in equilibrium in Williamson (2002), Nosal and Wallace (2007), Li and Ro-
cheteau (2011), Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012), and Shao (2014).6 On the other hand, some
papers, such as Kultti (1996), Green and Weber (1996), and Fung and Shao (2016), focused
only on equilibrium with counterfeits.7 Therefore, these previous works cannot rationalize
some of stylized facts about counterfeiting; for example, why counterfeiting is a problem in
some countries but fraud is not present (or negligible at least) in other countries?
Third, we explore the effects of monetary and anti-counterfeiting policies comprehensively
to characterize optimal government policy. Cavalcanti and Nosal (2011) study optimal al-
location by using a mechanism design approach, and Lengwiler (1997) analyses the optimal
security level of banknotes using a game theoretic model involving the central bank and a
counterfeiter. However, those researchers do not study how monetary and anti-counterfeiting
policies interact with each other to find optimal policy.
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies a private information problem with
a costly information acquisition in a monetary search framework. Kim (1996) and Berentsen
6Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) and Shao (2014) extend their models to make contracts incomplete, i.e.,
non-contingent on buyers’ type, and derive monetary equilibrium with counterfeiting. In the extension, Li
and Rocheteau (2011) show that their model can have monetary equilibrium with counterfeiting by relaxing
the assumption of full confiscation of counterfeits or by allowing sellers to set terms of trade in some matches.
Our study complements those papers in the sense that we obtain counterfeiting equilibrium by introducing
costly screening to detect counterfeits and show conditions under which counterfeits exist or not.
7Kultti (1996) assumes exogenous stock of counterfeits in the economy and studies the conditions under
which a monetary equilibrium can be sustained. Green and Weber (1996) deal more directly with counter-
feiting using costly counterfeiting technology, but in their model, money holding is restricted to either zero
or one and trades are deterministic, so genuine money holders cannot give signal to deviate from a candidate
pooling equilibrium. Fung and Shao (2016) study counterfeiting in a pooling equilibrium, but they do not
impose any restriction on sellers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs, which leads to indeterminacy of equilibrium.
6
and Rocheteau (2004) considered a costly inspection technology that improves the ability to
recognize the quality of goods supplied in the market, and studied the role of money that
is universally recognized under private information concerning the quality of goods. Lester,
Postlewaite, and Wright (2012) endogenized recognizability and liquidity of assets by letting
agents invest in information to distinguish the quality (genuine or fake) of certain assets
that can be used as a medium of exchanges. However, to use standard bargaining theory to
determine the terms of trade, they made the assumption that fake assets can be produced at
zero cost, which implies unrecognized assets are not accepted in a bilateral match. On the
other hand, in our paper, we explicitly deal with the bargaining problem under asymmetric
information using costly counterfeiting and costly screening.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the environment of
the baseline model and section 1.3 contains the construction and analysis of equilibrium.
In section 1.4, we extend the model to study optimal government policy. Section 1.5 is the
conclusion.
1.2 Environment
The general framework is built on Lagos and Wright (2005) with heterogeneous agents sim-
ilar to Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) incorporating the
counterfeiting technology from Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) and the screening technol-
ogy. Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2 . . ., and there are two subperiods within each period; the
centralized market (CM) followed by the decentralized market (DM).
There are two types of economic agents, each with unit mass: buyers and sellers. Each
buyer has preferences given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[Xt −Ht + u(xt)],
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and each seller has preferences given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[Xt −Ht − ht].
Here, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Xt and Ht are consumption and labor supply, respec-
tively, in the CM , xt is consumption in the DM , and ht is labor supply in the DM . We
assume that u(·) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differen-
tiable function with u(0) = 0, u′(0) =∞, u′(∞) = 0, −xu′′(x)
u′(x) < 1 for all x ≥ 0, and with the
property that there exists some x̂ such that u(x̂) = x̂. Define x∗ by u′(x∗) = 1.
Each agent can produce one unit of the perishable consumption good for each unit of labor
supply. Notice that buyers want to consume but cannot produce in the DM while sellers
can produce but do not wish to consume in the DM , which generates a double coincidence
problem. The CM is a centralized Walrasian market in which agents trade numeraire CM
goods and an asset. There are bilateral meetings between buyers and sellers in the DM .
In this economy there is no memory or recordkeeping, so that in any meeting, traders
have no knowledge of each other’s histories. Also no one can be forced to work, so lack of
memory implies that there can be no unsecured credit. Hence, an asset is essential for trade
to occur. The only asset in this economy is fiat money which is traded at the price φt in
terms of numeraire goods in the CM in period t. Money is supplied by the government at
the beginning of the CM with a lump-sum transfer Tt = (µ−1)φtMt−1 to each buyer. Thus,
the money stock grows at the constant gross rate µ. In the following, we consider the case
where φt
φt+1
> β.8
A key assumption is that a buyer can produce any quantity of fake money if he or she
incurs a fixed cost of k in the CM that can represent the cost of acquiring a sophisticated
reprographic machine and photo editing software. Counterfeit money is indistinguishable
from genuine money in the DM . However, we assume that money is perfectly recognizable
8In a stationary equilibrium, which we will focus on when characterizing equilibrium, φtφt+1 = µ, and there
is no equilibrium if µ < β as is standard in Lagos and Wright (2005) setups.
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in the CM , so all counterfeits are confiscated in the CM .9 As a result, there is no incentive
for sellers to receive counterfeits in a DM meeting. On the other hand, we assume that sellers
have a screening technology that can detect counterfeit money with γ units of labor in the
DM . One can think of the screening cost γ as the cost of installing an authentication device
or as the time and effort to scrutinize security features without error. At this moment, we
treat k and γ as parameters and we endogenize them in section 4 where we discuss optimal
government policy.
In this economy, the sequence of moves in each period is as follows: 1) At the beginning of
the CM in period t, the government transfers or taxes money to buyers in a lump-sum way.
2) The buyer chooses a portfolio of mt genuine money and m
c
t counterfeit money in terms of
period t+1 CM goods. 3) In the DM , the buyer is matched with a seller and makes an offer
(xt, dt) that specifies the quantity of DM goods produced by the seller xt and the money
transfer dt in terms of CM goods in period t+ 1 from the buyer to the seller. 4) The seller
decides whether to accept the offer or not. 5) If the seller accepts the offer, the buyer hands
over d̂t genuine money and d̂
c
t counterfeit money with d̂t+ d̂
c
t = dt. 6) Then, the seller decides
whether to screen the money. If the seller detects counterfeits through screening, then the
seller makes a new offer (xst , d
s
t) over DM goods production and legal money transfer, and
the buyer decides whether to accept the seller’s offer or not.10 Otherwise, the trade goes
through according to the proposed offer by the buyer.
9We make this assumption for the following reasons. First, if counterfeits are not recognizable in the CM
and buyers make counterfeits in equilibrium, then buyers would produce an infinite amount of counterfeits
in a given period to use them for trades in both the CM and DM (if possible) in all periods, which could
threaten the existence of monetary equilibrium in which money is used as a medium of exchanges. Second,
notice that it is weakly optimal for a buyer to produce an infinite quantity of counterfeits once he incurs
the fixed cost k. Thus, without the 100% confiscation of counterfeits, there would be two types of buyers
when counterfeits are produced: one with counterfeits from the previous period, and the other without any
counterfeits from the previous period. This would generate another signaling problem in addition to the
one we explore in this paper, which complicates the analysis. The limited ability of the government to take
counterfeits out of circulation can provide interesting new insights, but we leave this to future research.
10Without this assumption, the buyer may hold a portfolio of genuine money and counterfeits together in
equilibrium, which complicates the analysis than is necessary. By giving a whole bargaining power to the
seller when a counterfeit is detected, we can simplify a set of buyer’s actions for portfolio choice. See lemma
1 for more detail.
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1.3 Equilibrium
1.3.1 Payoffs
To set the stage for equilibrium characterization, we first describe agents’ payoff in the
game in a given period t. Because of the quasi-linearity of preferences in Lagos and Wright
models, the agent’s value in the CM is linear in his wealth and the choice of asset portfolio is
independent of his initial wealth when he entered the period and the government transfers.
Then, the buyer’s payoff in the game excluding the government transfers, given the sequence
of moves described above, is:
Sbt = −
(
φt
φt+1
− β
)
mt−kI{mct>0}+I{r=A}

(1− I{d̂ct>0}) [u(xt)− βdt]
+I{d̂ct>0}
 I{s=Y }I{rb=A} [u(x
s
t)− βdst ]
+(1− I{s=Y })
[
u(xt)− βd̂t
]

 ,
where I{mct>0}, I{r=A}, I{d̂ct>0}, I{s=Y }, and I{rb=A} are all indicator functions that equal one
if mct > 0, the seller accepts the buyer’s offer (r = A), the buyer hands over a positive amount
of counterfeits to the seller (d̂ct > 0), the seller screens the money (s = Y ), and the buyer
accepts the seller’s offer once counterfeits are detected by the seller (rb = A), respectively.
The term
(
φt
φt+1
− β
)
mt is the cost of holding mt legal money while in order to produce
mct > 0 counterfeits, the buyer must incur the fixed cost k. The terms in the big curly bracket
are the payoff from a trade with a seller. If the buyer does not hand over any counterfeits,
i.e., dt = d̂t, then the seller produces xt units of DM goods with certainty once he accepts the
offer. However, if the buyer hands over some counterfeits d̂ct , then the terms of trade depend
on whether the seller screens the money or not as well as the quantity of genuine money
that the buyer transferred, d̂t. First, if the seller screens the money and detects counterfeits,
then he makes a new offer (xst , d
s
t) to the buyer where d
s
t ≤ d̂t. However, if the seller does
not screen, then the buyer consumes xt units of DM goods for the exchange of d̂t units of
legal money.
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In a bilateral meeting, the seller’s money holding does not affect any outcome of the
game, so, given the money holding costs, the seller would not bring any money into the
DM . Then, the seller’s payoff when he meets a buyer who offers (xt, dt) can be written as
Sst = I{r=A}
I{s=Y }
 (1− I{d̂ct>0})(−xt + βdt)+I{d̂ct>0}I{rb=A}(−xst + βdst)− γ
+ (1− I{s=Y }) (−xt + βd̂t)
 .
Here, after accepting the buyer’s offer, if the seller screens the money, he will trade DM
goods only for the exchange of genuine money, but he has to pay the screening cost γ. On
the other hand, if he does not screen the money, then the trade occurs according to the
buyer’s offer (xt, dt), but he receives d̂t units of legal money that can be equal to or less than
dt.
1.3.2 Equilibrium concept
Our definition of equilibrium is standard: given prices, all agents behave optimally and
all markets clear in equilibrium. However, the environment generates a game between the
buyer and the seller for which we need a solution concept. Here, we adopt Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) as our equilibrium concept to the game: actions are sequentially rational
given a system of beliefs, and beliefs are derived from equilibrium strategies through Bayes’
rule whenever possible.
Before describing agents’ strategies and beliefs, we can simplify a buyer’s actions for
portfolio choice using the following logic. After detecting counterfeits, the seller makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer, and there is no asymmetric information on the authenticity
of the money on the table, which implies u(xst) − βdst = 0. Then, given u(xst) − βdst = 0,
mixing counterfeits and genuine money does not improve the buyer’s payoff because of the
fixed cost of counterfeiting and money holding costs. This argument leads to the next lemma.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, either 1) dt = d̂t ≤ mt and mct = 0 or 2) dt = d̂ct ≤ mct and
11
mt = 0.
Proof. See Appendix
Lemma 1 basically means that the buyer will either produce counterfeits or hold legal
money only; i.e., he will not hold both legal money and counterfeits in the DM . This implies
that, if the seller detects any counterfeits in the meeting, there will be no trade between
the buyer and the seller, i.e., xst = d
s
t = 0. Thus, in the following analysis, we eliminate
dominated actions and modify the set of agents’ actions in the game, such that: 1) the buyer
chooses his portfolio (mt,m
c
t) from the set M = {(m, 0)|m ∈ R+} ∪ {(0,mc)|mc ∈ R+} in
the CM ; 2) if the seller detects counterfeits through screening, the trade is not implemented.
Now, in the game, at a given period t, behavior strategies for a buyer include the prob-
ability measure Ft defined on the Borel algebra for the set M and the probability measure
Ωt|(m,mc) over the Boreal algebra for the set Sm = R+ × [0,m], where m = Max {m,mc},
conditional on (m,mc). Let supp(Ft) and supp(Ωt|(m,mc)) denote supports of the measures Ft
and Ωt|(m,mc), respectively. Seller’s behavior strategies are a decision rule ηt : R2+ → [0, 1] that
assigns a probability of acceptance to any feasible offers and a decision rule pit : R2+ → [0, 1]
that assigns a probability of screening the money for all feasible offers. Finally, the seller’s
belief regarding the buyer’s action about counterfeiting, conditional on the offer (x, d) being
made, is a mapping λt : R2+ → [0, 1] that assigns a probability that the seller meets a genuine
money holder.
Then, a PBE of the game at period t is a profile of behavior strategies
{
Ft,Ωt|(m,mc), ηt, pit
}
and belief function λt, such that 1) the agents’ behavior strategies are sequentially rational
at each information set, and 2) the belief function λt is derived from the strategy profile
through Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
More precisely, the probability measure Ωt|(m,mc), following portfolio choice (m,mc), must
be optimal, given the seller’s strategies; thus, for any (x, d) ∈ supp(Ωt|(m,mc)), it must be
(1) (x, d) ∈ arg max
(x˜,d˜)∈Sm
{
ηt
(
x˜, d˜
) [
u(x˜)− βd˜
]
+ βm
}
,
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if m > 0 and mc = 0, or
(2) (x, d) ∈ arg max
(x˜,d˜)∈Smc
{
ηt(x˜, d˜)
[
1− pit(x˜, d˜)
]
u(x˜)
}
,
if m = 0 and mc > 0. Let Vgt (m) and Vct (mc) be the maximized value of the objective
function in (1) and (2), respectively. Then, given the decision rule Ωt|(m,mc), Vgt (m), and
Vct (mc), the probability measure Ft must be optimal, that is, for any (m,mc) ∈ supp(Ft),
(m,mc) ∈ arg max
(m˜,m˜c)∈M
{
I{m˜>0}
[
− φt
φt+1
m˜+ Vgt (m˜)
]
+ I{m˜c>0} [−k + Vct (m˜c)]
}
,
where I{m˜>0} and I{m˜c>0} are indicator functions that equal one if m˜ > 0 and m˜c > 0,
respectively. Similarly, following an offer (x, d), the seller’s decision to accept the offer and
to screen the money must be optimal, given the buyer’s strategies and the seller’s belief, that
is,
(ηt, pit) ∈ arg max
(η˜,pi)∈[0,1]2
η˜
 pi [λt (x, d) (−x+ βd)− γ]+(1− pi) [λt (x, d) (−x+ βd)− (1− λt (x, d))x]

 .
Finally, in order to find conditions for the seller’s belief λt(x, d), let the distributionGt(m,m
c, x, d)
over (m,mc, x, d) ∈M×R2+ define the buyer’s mixed strategy that can be derived from the
buyer’s behavior strategies,
{
Ft,Ωt|(m,mc)
}
.11 Then, the seller’s belief λt (x, d), must satisfy
(3) λt (x, d) =
∫
(m˜,m˜c,x˜,d˜)∈[d,∞)×{0}×{x,d} dGt∫
(m˜,m˜c,x˜,d˜)∈[d,∞)×{0}×{x,d} dGt +
∫
(m˜,m˜c,x˜,d˜)∈{0}×[d,∞)×{x,d} dGt
if the denominator is strictly positive.
Because seller’s beliefs are not pinned down off the equilibrium path under the PBE in
equation (3), the game would generate a plethora of equilibria.12 However, in our economic
11In a game of perfect recall, mixed and behavior strategies are equivalent, according to Kuhn’s theorem
(see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
12For example, for any offer (xo, do) that satisfies 1) − φtφt+1 do + u(xo) > Max {0,−k + u(xo)}, and 2)
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environment, it is hard to apply standard refinement rules in signaling games such as the in-
tuitive criterion because the buyer’s type is chosen endogenously instead of being determined
exogenously by nature, so there are additional ways to deviate that must be unprofitable
in equilibrium. Instead, we adopt the concept of Reordering Invariance (RI) equilibrium, in
order to refine the set of equilibria of the game, proposed by In and Wright (forthcoming)
and applied by Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) in an asset exchange model. This refinement
selects equilibrium outcomes of the original game that are also equilibrium outcomes of a
reordered game in which observed actions (terms of trade) are chosen before unobserved
actions (portfolio choice), sharing the same reduced normal form as the original game. Re-
versing the order of the game does not affect equilibrium outcomes because the buyer does
not gain any pay-off relevant information between his unobserved and observed actions, and
this refinement rule has a strong game theoretic rationale and desirable normative properties
(see In and Wright, forthcoming).
The timing of reordered game is as follows: 1) At the beginning of the CM in period t
after the government transfers, the buyer posts his DM offer (xt, dt). 2) The buyer decides
whether to accumulate genuine money or to produce counterfeits for the trade. 3) In the
DM , the buyer is matched with a seller and the seller decides whether to accept or to reject
the offer. 4) Once the offer is accepted, the remaining procedures are the same as in the
original game. The game tree in Figure 1 depicts the sequence of moves in the reordered
game.
Because of the positive legal money holding costs, the buyer will only acquire d units of
real money in the CM whenever he decides to finance the trade (x, d) with legal money, i.e.,
mt = d, and he will produce m
c
t ≥ d units of counterfeits if he decides to have the trade
(x, d) with counterfeits. Thus, what matters in the buyer’s portfolio choice given an offer
(x, d) is whether to acquire legal money or to produce counterfeits. With this observation in
mind, buyer’s behavior strategies, in the reordered game, are the distribution Ωt(x, d) over
−xo+βdo > 0, it can be supported as a part of equilibrium where prob((m,mc, x, d) = (do, 0, xo, do)) = 1 with
a belief system λt such that λt(x
o, do) = 1 and λt(x, d) = 0, that implies ηt(x, d) = 0, for all (x, d) 6= (xo, do).
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Figure 1: Game tree of reordered game
offers (x, d) ∈ R2+ and a decision rule αt : R2+ → [0, 1] that assigns a probability that the
buyer accumulates genuine money conditional on (x, d). Seller’s behavior strategies at each
information set are the same as the ones in the original game.
Note, in the reordered game, that any posted offer (x, d) generates a proper subgame
denoted by Γt(x, d) in Figure 1. Then, by subgame perfection, agents’ strategies restricted
to this subgame following an offer (x, d) must form a Nash Equilibrium, so the seller can
correctly infer the buyer’s strategy αt(x, d). This implies that we can discipline sellers’
beliefs following all out-of-equilibrium offers (x, d) ∈ R2+ in a logically consistent way as
λt(x, d) = αt(x, d).
We now formally state the conditions that agents’ strategies must satisfy in the reordered
game. If there is no risk of confusion, we drop arguments for each decision rule from now
on; we use αt instead of αt(x, d), for instance. First, given the offer (x, d) and the seller’s
strategies regarding acceptance and screening, the buyer must minimize the cost of financing
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his DM trade, that is,
αt ∈ arg min
α˜∈[0,1]
{
α˜
[
φt
φt+1
− (1− ηt)β
]
d+ (1− α˜) [k + ηtpitu(x)]
}
.
Here, the term
[
φt
φt+1
− (1− ηt)β
]
d is the financing cost with genuine money: The holding
cost,
(
φt
φt+1
− β
)
d, plus the expected transferring cost, ηtβd. The term k+ηtpitu(x) relates to
the financing cost with counterfeiting that consists of the fixed cost of producing counterfeits,
k, and the expected cost of missing trade by screening in the DM , ηtpitu(x).
Second, the seller’s decision about acceptance and screening must be optimal given the
offer (x, d) and the buyer’s strategy, that is,
(ηt, pit) ∈ arg max
(η˜,pi)∈[0,1]2
{η˜ [−x+ αtβd+ pi[(1− αt)x− γ]]} ,
where we imposed the condition that λt = αt. The seller’s payoff has two components. The
first term, −x + αtβd, is the expected payoff from trade without screening, and the second
term, pi[(1− αt)x− γ], is the net payoff from screening.
Finally, given equilibrium decision rules {αt, ηt, pit}, the buyer’s optimal offer maximizes
his expected payoff, that is,
(xt, dt) ∈ arg max
(x˜,d˜)∈R2+
 αt
[
− φt
φt+1
d˜+ ηt
(
u(x˜)− βd˜
)
+ βd˜
]
+(1− αt) [−k + ηt(1− pit)u(x˜)]
 .
Even though reordering of the game narrows down equilibria of the original game by
disciplining the seller’s belief λt in an effective way, reordering itself does not guarantee a
unique equilibrium outcome in general. In particular, in our model, given (x, d), there could
be multiple Nash equilibria of the subgame Γt(x, d), which affects, in turn, a buyer’s optimal
posting decision.
It is useful to select among equilibria by restricting attention to Pareto dominant Nash
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equilibria of Γt(x, d): there is no other Nash equilibrium that makes every player at least as
well off and at least one player strictly better off.13 Then, given the Pareto dominant Nash
equilibrium conditions of the subgame Γt(x, d) following all feasible offers (x, d), the buyer
posts an offer (x, d) so as to maximize his payoff.
1.3.3 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this subsection, we characterize a stationary equilibrium. By stationarity, we mean that
all real quantities are constant over time, and buyers and sellers play the game repeatedly in
the stationary economy. This implies that the inflation rate equals the money growth rate,
i.e., φt
φt+1
= µ.
We now show how to characterize an equilibrium by solving an optimization problem.
Consider the following auxiliary problem,
(P ) S
b
= Max
x≥0,d≥0,α,η,pi
 α [−µd+ η (u(x)− βd) + βd]+(1− α) [−k + η(1− pi)u(x)]

subject to
α ∈ arg min
α˜∈[0,1]
{α˜ [µ− (1− η)β] d+ (1− α˜) [k + ηpiu(x)]}(4)
(η, pi) ∈ arg max
(η˜,pi)∈[0,1]2
{η˜ [−x+ αβd+ pi[(1− α)x− γ]]} .(5)
The problem (P ) looks similar with the actual buyer’s problem in the game, but there
are two major differences. First, in the maximization problem (P ), we only require the Nash
13In Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) where there is no screening technology, they did not make any
assumptions about selecting equilibrium in the subgame. The difference in their model is that there exists
only a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame given the optimal offer. Thus, by perturbing the
offer slightly, they can make a sequence of offers such that all incentive constraints are slack, so the Nash
equilibrium of the subgame following perturbed offers is unique and the sequence of offers converges to the
equilibrium offer. However, in our model, there could be both a mixed and a pure strategy equilibrium
following the equilibrium offer, and we cannot apply the argument of Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) when
a mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Thus, we resort to the Pareto dominance rule instead.
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equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) of the subgame Γ(x, d) following an offer (x, d) without
the Pareto dominance condition.14 Second, though the buyer cannot arbitrarily pick an
equilibrium of the subgame Γ(x, d) when there are multiple equilibria, {α, η, pi} is a set of
choice variables in the maximization problem of (P ). Therefore, S
b
is an upper bound of the
buyer’s payoff in any equilibrium of the game. Hence, if the buyer can attain S
b
by posting
(x, d), it must be an equilibrium offer.
It will be shown in proposition 1 below that an equilibrium can be constructed and char-
acterized by solving (P ). As a preliminary step, we provide some of properties of a solution
to (P ) beforehand with the interpretation of these properties as equilibrium outcomes.
To begin, observe that for any xo ≤ β
µ
k, (x, d, α, η, pi) =
(
xo, x
o
β
, 1, 1, 0
)
satisfies (4) and
(5). Then, the buyer’s expected surplus becomes positive with sufficiently small xo because
lim
x→0
u′(x) = ∞, which implies that Sb must be strictly positive. Thus, any solution must
feature x > 0 and η > 0 because the buyer’s expected surplus is non-positive otherwise.
Also, if α = 0 with positive x, then η = 0 by (5). Thus, it must be α > 0 for any solution to
(P ). Given these, next lemma shows a property of a solution providing a useful intermediate
step to solve (P ).
Lemma 2 Any solution to (P ) has following form: either 1) α = 1 and pi = 0 or 2)
α ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix
The main implication of lemma 2 is that counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium where buyers
attain S
b
only if screening activity exists in the economy. To get some intuition about the
logic of this result, consider an offer (x, d) that induces α ∈ (0, 1) and pi = 0 in the subgame
Γ(x, d). The indifference condition of the buyer (4) means that [µ− (1− η)β] d = k. Now
14Formally, the Pareto dominance condition of a Nash equilibrium {α, η, pi} of the subgame Γ(x, d) can be
stated as there is no other {α′, η′, pi′} that satisfies (4) and (5) such that
α′ [µ− (1− η′)β] d+ (1− α′) [k + η′pi′u(x)] ≤ α [µ− (1− η)β] d+ (1− α) [k + ηpiu(x)]
η′ [−x+ α′βd+ pi′[(1− α′)x− γ]] ≥ η [−x+ αβd+ pi[(1− α)x− γ]]
with at least one strict inequality.
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consider a new offer (x, d′) with d′ = αd. Then, [µ− (1− η)β] d′ < k, so it is better for the
buyer to bring genuine money with certainty, i.e., α′ = 1, provided that η′ = η and pi′ = 0.
Furthermore, if α′ = 1, then there is no reason for the seller to screen the money, so pi′ = 0.
Then, the seller’s payoff does not change, so η′ = η is still optimal. Therefore, the buyer can
increase his payoff by reducing the quantity of money transfer that prevents counterfeiting
from taking place while keeping the seller’s expected payoff unchanged. This profitable
deviation explains why counterfeiting does not emerge in equilibrium in previous studies
such as Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) and Shao (2014) in which there is no screening
technology.
It is also clear, from (4) and (5), under what conditions, screening can exist with coun-
terfeiting in the economy. As we argued above, for the buyer to trade with a seller in the
DM with a positive probability, he must propose an offer that induces α > 0 that requires
(6) [µ− (1− η)β] d ≤ k + ηpiu(x).
Without screening, i.e., pi = 0, the money transfer d and the output of DM goods x that
induces η > 0 can be very low if the counterfeiting cost k is too low. By allowing a positive
probability of screening by the seller, the buyer can relax this constraint and increase the
trade volume in the DM . However, for the seller to find it optimal to screen the money in
equilibrium, the buyer must hand over counterfeits with a positive probability to satisfy (5),
so (6) must hold with equality.
Lemma 3 For any solution to (P ), η = 1 and x = αβd.
Proof. See Appendix
Lemma 3 basically means that the buyer makes an offer that is accepted with certainty
and the seller earns zero profit in expectation in equilibrium where buyers attain his max-
imum payoff S
b
. The result that x = αβd implies that the seller’s expected payoff is zero,
which is intuitive given that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. Next,
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η = 1 means that the buyer makes an offer that is accepted with probability one, and Li,
Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) show the same result in their model in which there is no screen-
ing technology, so counterfeiting does not occur in equilibrium. Here, we only provide the
intuition for the finding of η = 1 when there are counterfeiting and screening in the economy.
Suppose (α, η, pi) ∈ (0, 1)3. In this case, the constraint (6) binds with equality because of the
buyer’s indifference condition. A profitable deviation for the buyer consists of increasing the
probability of acceptance by the seller, η′ ∈ (η, 1), with a change of the screening probability,
pi′ ∈ (0, 1), such that the constraint (6) still holds with equality.15 Then, {η′, α, pi′} satisfies
(4) and (5) but the buyer’s payoff increases with the higher probability of acceptance of the
offer by the seller.
Given lemma 2 and 3, we can rewrite the problem (P ) as
(P ′) S
b
= Max
x≥0,d≥0,α,pi
{−µd+ u(x)}
subject to
x = αβd(7)
α ∈ arg max
α˜∈[0,1]
{α˜ [−µd+ k + piu(x)]}(8)
pi ∈ arg max
pi∈[0,1]
{pi[(1− α)x− γ]} .(9)
Because −µd + u(αβd) is maximized with d = 1
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
and α = 1, whenever this is
feasible, it must be a solution. This is possible if and only if k ≥ µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, and the solution
to (P ′) is x = u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, d = 1
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, α = 1, and pi = 0 in this case.
When k < µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, finding a solution of (P ′) becomes more complicated. However,
by virtue of lemma 2, we can restrict our analysis to two cases: 1) α = 1 and pi = 0, or 2)
α ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1). We consider these two cases separately and take the max of the
15Notice that by the assumption that (α, η, pi) ∈ (0, 1)3, (1 − α)x = γ. Thus, changing pi does not affect
the seller’s expected payoff under this deviation, and η′ ∈ (0, 1) is still optimal.
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two to solve the problem (P ′).
First, consider the case with (α, pi) = (1, 0) that requires, from (8), that
(10) d ≤ k
µ
.
This is the incentive compatibility constraint for the buyer not to commit forgery without
screening. Given k < µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, (10) must bind to maximize the objective function of (P ′),
so x = βk
µ
, d = k
µ
. Substituting this candidate solution into the objective function of (P ′),
we obtain Sbtc ≡ −k + u
(
βk
µ
)
> 0. Here, the trade volume in the DM is limited by the
counterfeiting cost k and the buyer’s surplus Sbtc converges to zero as k → 0.
Second, consider a candidate solution with α ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1). The conditions (8)
and (9) yield a mixed strategy equilibrium only if the following equations hold:
µd = k + piu(x)(11)
(1− α)x = γ.(12)
As one can see from (10) and (11), a positive probability of screening, pi > 0, allows the
buyer to make an offer with the money transfer higher than k
µ
, so the buyer could consume
more DM goods. However, there is a cost for this strategy. To make the seller to screen the
money with a positive probability, the buyer must produce and transfer counterfeits with a
positive probability, i.e., α < 1, so (12) holds. Then, because the seller receives legal money
with a probability of α, the buyer must hand over d = x
αβ
units of money, that is higher than
x
β
, to make the seller earns non-negative profit in expectation. Thus, there is additional cost
to finance DM trade which is caused by the fraud and screening. Then, the buyer optimally
chooses (x, d, α, pi) considering all those effects on his payoff.
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Lemma 4 Suppose −µ
β
x2γ
xγ−γ + u(xγ) ≥ 0, where xγ ∈
(
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
,∞
)
is given by
(13)
µ
β
=
(xγ − γ)2
xγ(xγ − 2γ)u
′(xγ).
Then, the candidate solution of (P ′) where (α, pi) ∈ (0, 1)2 is x = xγ, d = x
2
γ
β(xγ−γ) , α = 1−
γ
xγ
,
and pi = 1
u(xγ)
{
µ
β
x2γ
xγ−γ − k
}
, and the value of the objective function is Sbc = −µβ
x2γ
xγ−γ + u(xγ).
Proof. See Appendix
The final step is to compare the buyer’s payoff under each candidate solution to get
S
b
= Max{Sbtc, Sbc}. Subtracting Sbtc from Sbc , we obtain
(14) G(µ, k, γ) ≡ −µ
β
x2γ
xγ − γ + u(xγ)−
{
−k + u
(
βk
µ
)}
.
Thus, if G(µ, k, γ) < 0, then (x, d, α, pi) = (βk
µ
, k
µ
, 1, 0) is the solution to (P ′).16 On the other
hand, if G(µ, k, γ) > 0, then (x, d, α, pi) =
(
xγ,
x2γ
β(xγ−γ) , 1−
γ
xγ
, 1
u(xγ)
{
µ
β
x2γ
xγ−γ − k
})
solves
(P ′). Finally, in the knife edge case where G(µ, k, γ) = 0, Sbtc = S
b
c , so both candidate
solutions solve (P ′).
To gather more intuition about the influence of the counterfeiting environment, (k, γ),
on the economy, take derivatives G with respect to k and γ to obtain
∂G
∂k
= 1− β
µ
u′
(
βk
µ
)
< 0,
∂G
∂γ
= −µ
β
(
xγ
xγ − γ
)2
< 0,
where the inequality of the first equation comes from the assumption that k < µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
,
and we used the envelope theorem to obtain the second result. Note that G(µ, k, 0) > 0 and
16In lemma 4, we derive the second candidate solution of (P ′) only for the case that Sbc ≥ 0, even though it
is possible to have Sbc < 0 with sufficiently high γ. However, this is without loss of generality in the following
sense: Sbc is an upper bound of the maximized value of the problem (P
′) with constraints that (α, pi) ∈ (0, 1)2
because we do not use constraints (11) and pi ∈ (0, 1) to get Sbc (see the proof for details). Thus, whenever
Sbc < 0, (x, d, α, pi) = (
βk
µ ,
k
µ , 1, 0) solves (P
′).
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G(µ, k,∞) < 0 provided that k < µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
. Taken together with the result of the case
where k ≥ µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, we define a new function γ̂ : [β,∞)× (0,∞)→ R such that
(15) γ̂(µ, k) =
 γ̂ > 0 that satisfies G(µ, k, γ̂) = 0 if k <
µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
0 if k ≥ µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
.
Then, if γ < γ̂(µ, k), a solution (x, d, α, η, pi) that solves (P ) features α < 1.
So far, we have characterized the upper bound of payoff attainable by buyers. The last
step is to show that equilibrium can be characterized using (P ). The basic idea, detailed
in the proof, is to show that for any solution (x, d, α, η, pi) of (P ), {α, [η, pi]} is a unique
Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium in the following subgame Γ(x, d). Thus, whenever the
buyer posts (x, d) that solves (P ), he can achieve the maximum payoff S
b
. This leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists monetary equilibrium that features:
1. [No threat of counterfeiting] If k ≥ µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, then x = u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, d = 1
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
, α = 1,
η = 1, and pi = 0
2. [Threat of counterfeiting] If k < µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
and γ ≥ γ̂(µ, k), then x = βk
µ
, d = k
µ
, α = 1,
η = 1, and pi = 0
3. [Counterfeiting] If k < µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
and γ < γ̂(µ, k), then x = xγ, d =
x2γ
β(xγ−γ) , α = 1−
γ
xγ
,
η = 1, and pi = 1
u(xγ)
{
µ
β
x2γ
xγ−γ − k
}
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Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 1 shows how the counterfeiting environment, (k, γ), and the inflation rate,
µ, together determine the existence of particular equilibria. This result is illustrated with
Figure 2 that depicts how the parameter space is subdivided with k on the vertical axis, and
17When the equilibrium type switches from the threat of counterfeiting to the counterfeiting, the set of
strategies {x, d, α, η, pi} changes discontinuously. Thus, in the knife edge case where γ = γ̂(µ, k), the model
admits multiple equilibria. However, analysis of multiple equilibria does not give any important insight at
this moment, so we assume that the economy is in the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium in this case. Later,
we discuss multiple equilibria when we characterize welfare in section 4.
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Figure 2: Equilibria with the counterfeiting environment (k, γ)
γ on the horizontal axis given the inflation rate µ.
In the no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium, the counterfeiting cost is too high for the
buyer to produce fake money. In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint (10) does
not bind. The terms of trade (x, d) are the same as the ones in an economy where there is
no possibility of counterfeiting when the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
In the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium, a low counterfeiting cost is accompanied with a
relatively high screening cost; γ ≥ γ̂(µ, k). Because of the low counterfeiting cost, there could
exist the incentive for the buyer to produce counterfeits. However, the buyer offers terms
of trade that thwart entry in counterfeiting by limiting the money transfer with the binding
incentive compatibility constraint (10) instead of making an offer that induces counterfeiting
and screening because of the high screening cost. In this case, the usefulness of money as a
medium of exchange depends on the counterfeiting cost, k, so the quantity of goods traded,
x, is inefficiently low.
Finally, when both the counterfeiting cost and the screening cost are sufficiently low, the
economy is in the counterfeiting equilibrium. If k is very low, the binding constraint (10)
without screening can be too restrictive on the money transfer d. Further, if the screening
cost is low such that γ < γ̂(µ, k) as in this equilibrium, the costs from having a positive
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probability of frauds and screening are relatively low.18 Thus, it is better for the buyer
to make an offer that induces positive probabilities of counterfeiting and screening in the
following subgame, so (11) and (12) hold, instead of satisfying the constraint (10). In this
case, the quantity of DM goods traded, x, the money transfer, d, and the probability that
the buyer hands over genuine money, α, depend on γ but not on k. The counterfeiting
cost, k, only affects the probability of screening, pi. Thus, the model implies that the
extent that money facilitates exchange depends on the ease of screening out fake money in
the counterfeiting equilibrium while it depends on the counterfeiting cost in the threat of
counterfeiting equilibrium.
One interesting feature in the counterfeiting equilibrium is that consumption in the DM
is higher than in an economy where counterfeiting was not even a possibility: xγ > u
′−1
(
µ
β
)
(see lemma 4). This result can be understood by looking at the indifference condition
(12). The reason to offer (x, d) that induces a positive probability of screening is to consume
higher quantity of DM goods x. According to (12), higher x increases α in the counterfeiting
equilibrium. The seller can avoid producing DM goods for nothing if he detects counterfeit
money. Thus, if x increases, the probability that the buyer hands over genuine money must
increase to keep the seller indifferent between screening and no screening given the fixed cost
of screening γ. However, non-negative profit condition of the seller, x = αβd, implies that
the relative money transfer to the DM goods produced, d
x
, decreases with x. Because of this
pecuniary effect of increasing x, the buyer offers xγ that is strictly higher than u
′−1
(
µ
β
)
.
As one can see from proposition 1, our model admits both equilibria with and with-
out counterfeiting and a monetary equilibrium always exists. Thus, the model can explain
the cross-country differences in counterfeiting experiences as an equilibrium outcome.19 For
example, two countries with the same inflation rate could have different counterfeiting expe-
riences depending on the counterfeiting environment (k, γ). These cross-country differences
18Note that as γ → 0, α→ 1 from (12), so d = xαβ → xβ and the additional cost from frauds disappears.
19For example, counterfeiting is a problem in some countries while it is not in other countries (see Fung
and Shao 2011 for details).
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could not be well explained by previous models in which counterfeiting does not occur or
always exists in equilibrium.
On a related point, it seems worthwhile to discuss recent work on fraudulent practices in
asset markets in the context of asset exchange models, Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) and
Shao (2014).20 One of main implications in their research is that the threat of counterfeiting
generates an endogenous resalability constraint similar to (10), specifying the asset’s use-
fulness as a medium of exchange. It is this incentive compatibility constraint that prevents
forgery from taking place, and it is so powerful that fraud does not occur in equilibrium even
with the counterfeiting cost close to zero.
One unnoticed assumption, however, in their models is that there is no screening tech-
nology, so the only strategy for a seller in response to counterfeiting is rejecting an offer: If
trade involves an asset transfer greater than the upper bound specified by the resalability
constraint, then the seller would reject the offer with a positive probability. However, as
argued above, this cannot be optimal for the buyer.
By incorporating a screening technology, our model shows that this resalability constraint
can become ineffective thus generating fraud as an equilibrium outcome provided that the
screening cost is sufficiently low. The intuition is simple: With the screening technology, the
seller has an additional action to react to counterfeiting, and as long as the seller earns non-
negative profit ex-ante with the optimal screening strategy, he would accept the buyer’s offer
with certainty even though the resalability constraint is not satisfied. Notice that our model
encompasses those previous studies as a special case where the screening cost is sufficiently
high.
Monetary policy and the equilibrium type So far, we have taken the inflation rate, µ,
as given. We now study how monetary policy that determines µ affects economic agents’ be-
haviors and hence the equilibrium type. Given the assumption that −xu′′(x)
u′(x) < 1,
µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
20Observe that all agents take the inflation rate that is the inverse of the rate of return on money as given
when they make their optimal strategies in the game. Thus, all of previous analysis can be applied to the
economy with real assets like Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012).
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is decreasing in µ. Thus, if k ≥ x∗, the economy is in the no threat of counterfeiting equilib-
rium for all monetary policy µ ≥ β (see the first part of proposition 1).
If k < x∗, there exists unique value µk > β that satisfies
(16) k =
µk
β
u′−1
(
µk
β
)
.
Then, for all µ ≥ µk, the no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium exists. On the other
hand, when µ < µk, the economy is in either the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium or the
counterfeiting equilibrium. Because xγ >
βk
µ
in this case, we obtain, from (14),
∂G
∂µ
=
1
µ
{
− xγ − γ
xγ − 2γxγu
′(xγ) +
βk
µ
u′
(
βk
µ
)}
< 0,
so it is more likely that the counterfeiting equilibrium exists as µ decreases. More precisely, a
decrease in µ shifts the horizontal line at point µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
and the curve given by γ̂(µ, k) = γ
in Figure 2 upward, so the parameter space (γ, k) for the counterfeiting equilibrium to exist
expands.
To facilitate the presentation of the effects of µ on the equilibrium type, we derive a new
critical value of µ in a following way. Note, from (15), that for all k < x∗, there exists unique
γ̂(β, k) > 0 such that G(β, k, γ̂(β, k)) = 0. Then because G(µ, k, γ) is decreasing in each
argument there exists unique µγ ∈ (β, µk), for all γ < γ̂(β, k), that satisfies
(17) G(µγ, k, γ) = 0.
Thus, G(µ, k, γ) > 0 for all µ ∈ [β, µγ), and G(µ, k, γ) ≤ 0 for all µ ∈ [µγ, µk). Notice that
the critical value µγ is a decreasing function of k and γ because of the property of G(µ, k, γ).
On the other hand, if γ ≥ γ̂(β, k), then G(µ, k, γ) ≤ 0 for all µ ∈ [β, µk). In summary, we
have the following proposition, whose proof is omitted, that describes how monetary policy
determines the equilibrium type given k and γ.
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Proposition 2 1. Suppose k ≥ x∗. Then, the no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium exists
for all µ ≥ β.
2. Suppose k < x∗ and γ ≥ γ̂(β, k). Then, i) the no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium
exists for all µ ≥ µk, and ii) the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium exists for all µ ∈ [β, µk).
3. Suppose k < x∗ and γ < γ̂(β, k). Then, i) the no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium
exists for all µ ≥ µk, ii) the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium exists for all µ ∈ [µγ, µk),
and iii) the counterfeiting equilibrium exists for all µ ∈ [β, µγ).
Figure 3 illustrates graphically proposition 2.21 As one can see from proposition 2 and
Figure 3, it is more likely that counterfeits circulate in the economy with low inflation. Put
differently, for any counterfeiting environment, (k, γ), there exists a cutoff inflation rate µγ
(or β), such that if the inflation rate is above this cutoff value, counterfeits do not exist.
The intuition for this finding is as follows. When inflation is high, the cost of holding money
is high so quantity of goods traded in the DM is small with genuine money. In this case,
counterfeiting would be unprofitable because of its fixed cost. However, as inflation falls, the
buyer can finance more DM goods with genuine money, which induces a higher incentive
to produce fake money, and finally counterfeiting occurs when inflation is sufficiently low
provided that γ < γ̂(β, k).
Equilibrium Comparative Statics Propositions 1 and 2 provide comprehensive analysis
of conditions under which counterfeits circulate or not in the economy. To gather more
intuition for the effects of the counterfeiting environment, (k, γ), and the inflation rate, µ,
on the economy, we investigate comparative statics with respect to these variables that are
summarized in Table 1. Because the analysis for the other two cases are straightforward, we
focus on the comparative statics in the counterfeiting equilibrium.
First, an increase of inflation lowers x and d because of its influence on the money holding
cost (see lemma 4). Given this result, the probability of holding genuine money, α, must fall
21In the left panel, k satisfies γ̂(β, k) = γ given the assumption that γ < γ̂(β, k = 0), and we draw the
right panel with the assumption that k < x∗.
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Figure 3: Equilibria with the counterfeiting environment and monetary policy
No threat of counterfeiting Threat of counterfeiting Counterfeiting
∂x
∂ι
∂d
∂ι
∂α
∂ι
∂pi
∂ι
∂x
∂ι
∂d
∂ι
∂α
∂ι
∂pi
∂ι
∂x
∂ι
∂d
∂ι
∂α
∂ι
∂pi
∂ι
µ − − · · − − · · − − − ?
k · · · · + + · · · · · −
γ · · · · · · · · + + − +
Table 1: Effects of the inflation rate and parameters in each equilibrium
with respect to µ in order to satisfy the seller’s indifference condition (12). An increase in µ
has an ambiguous effect on the probability of screening, pi.22
Second, the counterfeiting cost, k, has no influence on terms of trade (x, d), and the
probability of accumulating genuine money, α. It only affects the probability of screening,
pi, via the buyer’s indifference condition (11), and pi decreases with k, which is intuitive.
Finally, the effects of γ on equilibrium outcomes require more detailed analysis. From
(13), we obtain
∂xγ
∂γ
=
2γxγu
′(xγ)
2γ2u′(xγ)− xγ(xγ − γ)(xγ − 2γ)u′′(xγ) > 0.
22We conclude this result with a numerical simulation. In general, when γ is low ∂pi∂µ < 0 whereas
∂pi
∂µ > 0
when γ is relatively high. However, under some parameter values, pi(µ) is a parabola, i.e., ∂pi∂µ < 0 for
µ ∈ [β, µ′) and ∂pi∂µ > 0 for µ ∈ [µ′, µγ).
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Next, taking derivatives α = 1− γ
xγ
with respect to γ, we get
∂α
∂γ
=
(xγ − γ)(xγ − 2γ)u′′(xγ)
2γ2u′(xγ)− xγ(xγ − γ)(xγ − 2γ)u′′(xγ) < 0.
Thus, an increase of γ raises x but lowers α. The mechanism for these results can be found
from the seller’s indifference condition (12). When γ increases, the buyer must decrease α or
increase x to satisfy this indifference condition. Even though higher x means more consump-
tion in the DM , the buyer also has to consider the genuine money transfer, d = x
αβ
. Because
of the effects on the money transfer, buyers respond to an increase in γ with higher x but
lower α in the counterfeiting equilibrium. The comparative statics for d come directly from
the comparative statics for x and α; ∂d
∂γ
> 0. Last, differentiating pi = 1
u(xγ)
{
µx2γ
β(xγ−γ) − k
}
with respect to γ, we get
∂pi
∂γ
= (1− pi)u
′(xγ)
u(xγ)
∂xγ
∂γ
+
1
u(xγ)
µ
β
(
xγ
xγ − γ
)2
> 0.
This result appears to be counter-intuitive because one would expect that the seller will
screen money less with a higher screening cost. However, as long as the seller’s indifference
condition (12) is satisfied, changing pi does not affect the seller’s expected surplus. pi is
adjusted to satisfy the buyer’s indifference condition (11) in the counterfeiting equilibrium.
More precisely, substituting d =
x2γ
β(xγ−γ) into (11) and totally differentiating with respect to x
and pi, we obtain
{
−µ
β
xγ(xγ−2γ)
(xγ−γ)2 + piu
′(xγ)
}
4x+u(x)4pi = 0. Then, because −µ
β
xγ(xγ−2γ)
(xγ−γ)2 +
piu′(xγ) < 0 by (13), pi must increase with γ given
∂xγ
∂γ
> 0.
Inflation rate and counterfeiting We close this section with a study of a relationship
between the inflation rate µ and the measure of agents committing fraud, 1−α. Proposition
2 shows that when k < x∗ and γ < γ̂(β, k), the threat of counterfeiting intensifies as
inflation falls, and finally counterfeiting materializes in equilibrium since µ becomes lower
than µγ. However,
∂(1−α)
∂µ
> 0 in the counterfeiting equilibrium. Thus, in this environment,
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Figure 4: Measure of frauds (1− α) and the inflation rate µ
the measure of frauds represented by 1−α rises as µ increases from β, but it drops suddenly
to 0 once µ hits the tipping point µγ as described in Figure 4.
23
This feature is useful for understanding the episodic nature of counterfeiting and the
unintended results of the anti-counterfeiting policy in Canada.24 These can be explained
as an equilibrium outcome in our model using the properties that ∂µγ
∂k
< 0 and ∂µγ
∂γ
< 0.
Suppose an economy is in the threat of counterfeiting equilibrium with the inflation rate µ
close to µγ. If there exists a technological innovation that reduces the counterfeiting cost k
such that the new critical value µ′γ is higher than the inflation rate µ, then counterfeits rise
sharply in this economy. After the government puts its effort on developing banknotes that
are difficult to counterfeit or promoting screening of banknotes by retailers, then counterfeits
decrease or disappear from the economy. By the same reasoning, unless the screening cost
was cut down significantly such that γ′ ≈ 0, an inadequate reduction of γ may manifest itself
as a sharp increase of counterfeits in this environment.
23In the discussion of Cavalcanti and Nosal (2011), Monnet (2011) shows positive relationship between
inflation and counterfeiting using heterogeneous counterfeiting costs. The difference in his model is that
counterfeiting increases monotonically with inflation which implies countries with hyper-inflation suffer the
highest counterfeiting. However, it is quite intuitive that no one would struggle to produce fake Reichsmark,
old currency of Germany, during the period from 1922 to 1923 when the country went through its worst
inflation.
24Counterfeits of $10 banknotes in Canada increased significantly after a launch of a new series of $10
banknotes in 2001 (see “Bank of Canada Annual Report 2002” and “Bank of Canada Annual Report 2003”
for more information).
31
1.4 Optimal government policy
In this section, we study optimal government policy that consists of monetary policy and
anti-counterfeiting policy. Anti-counterfeiting policy determines the counterfeiting environ-
ment (k, γ). This is one of main problems that monetary authorities face whenever they
develop a new series of banknotes. The government must deliberate on a reasonable trade-
off between improved security and the added cost of a counterfeit deterrence measure in
order to maximize welfare. In addition to anti-counterfeiting policy, counterfeiting cannot
be separated from monetary policy, which affects the value of money. Therefore, these two
policies must be taken into account together to find the optimal government policy.
For this purpose, we endogenize k and γ in a following way: The government taxes
τ1, τ2, and τ3 to buyers in a lump sum way in the CM of each period and invest in a
counterfeit deterrence system to maintain k = k(τ1, τ2) and γ = γ(τ1, τ3). We assume that
k and γ are twice continuously differentiable functions with each argument, and satisfy
ki > 0, kii < 0, γi < 0, and γii > 0 where ki =
∂k(τ1,τ2)
∂τi
, for instance, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus,
anti-counterfeiting policy aims to improve two dimensions in the counterfeiting environment:
An increase of the counterfeiting cost and a decrease of the screening cost. We further assume
that k(0, 0) = 0, γ(0, 0) =∞, lim
τ1→∞
lim
τ2→∞
k(τ1, τ2) > x
∗, and lim
τ1→∞
lim
τ3→∞
γ(τ1, τ2) = 0.
For the detailed study of anti-counterfeiting policy, we introduce three types of counterfeit
deterrence measures into the model to capture practices in the real world. First, observe
that τ1 affects both k and γ. We make this assumption to reflect the nature of counterfeit
deterrence measures because both dimensions are inter-related. For the security features of a
banknote to work as a screening device, they must be hard to counterfeit. Therefore, adding
new security features to banknotes makes the screening easier while making the production
of forged notes harder.
However, there are also anti-counterfeiting measures that focus only on one dimension
that is captured by τ2 and τ3. Currently, for example, it is no longer possible to reproduce
U.S. banknotes with personal computers and digital imaging tools because of a digital wa-
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termark that is embedded in banknotes.25 This system makes counterfeiting much harder
because forgers need other machines to make bogus money, but this measure does not im-
prove the screening process. On the other hand, the main purpose of public education about
the security features incorporated in banknotes and development of a portable counterfeit
detector is to make the screening process easier, but these measures are not related to the
production of counterfeits.
To study optimal policy, we need an aggregate welfare measure. If we measure welfare
as the sum of expected utilities across agents with equal weight, we obtain
(18) W(µ, τ) = [1− pi(1− α)][u(x)− x]− (1− α)k(τ1, τ2)− piγ(τ1, τ3)− τ1 − τ2 − τ3,
where τ = (τ1, τ2, τ3). As in most Lagos and Wright (2005) setups, CM activities that
involve money trades cancel out. However, the labor input to produce fake money in the
CM and the labor for screening in the DM do not improve any others consumption, so they
only reduce welfare. Also, when counterfeiting and screening exist, missing trade surplus,
captured by pi(1− α)[u(x)− x], is the deadweight loss of welfare.
As shown in propositions 1 and 2, the counterfeiting cost, k, the screening cost, γ, and
monetary policy, µ, interact with each other in determining the equilibrium type, and each
element has different effects on the economy depending on the other two elements. Therefore,
in order to study optimality, we have to consider all policy measures together. However,
understanding how optimal monetary policy depends on the counterfeiting environment is
also of interest to the government. Thus, we first take τ as given, and find µ∗(τ) that is
obtained by
µ∗(τ) ∈ arg max
µ≥β
W˜(µ; τ) ≡ [1− pi(1− α)][u(x)− x]− (1− α)k − piγ
25A counterfeit deterrence system (CDS) has been developed by the Central Bank Counterfeit Deter-
rence Group (CBCDG) to deter the use of personal computers, digital imaging equipment, and soft-
ware in the counterfeiting of banknotes in 2004. For more information, visit their official website
(http://www.rulesforuse.org).
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Figure 5: Welfare W˜(µ; τ) and the inflation rate
subject to the equilibrium conditions described in proposition 1.26 Then, the optimal gov-
ernment policy (µ∗, τ ∗) is given by (µ∗(τ ∗), τ ∗) where τ ∗ maximizes W(µ∗(τ), τ) subject to
agents’ optimal behaviors.
Since k ≤ x∗ must hold with optimal government policy, we assume this condition in
the following analysis without loss of generality. Suppose first that γ ≥ γ̂(β, k). Then, the
economy is in either the no threat of counterfeiting equilibrium or the threat of counterfeiting
equilibrium depending on µ. Substituting the allocation (x, d, α, pi) under each equilibrium
to W˜(µ; τ), we obtain
W˜n(µ; τ) = u
(
u′−1
(
µ
β
))
− u′−1
(
µ
β
)
for all µ ≥ µk
W˜t(µ; τ) = u
(
βk
µ
)
− βk
µ
for all µ ∈ [β, µk).
Notice that u′−1
(
µ
β
)
and βk
µ
are less than x∗ for any µ ≥ β, so both W˜n(µ; τ) and W˜t(µ; τ)
are decreasing in µ. Next, by definition of µk, W˜n(µk; τ) = W˜t(µk; τ). Given these two
observations, we get the left panel of Figure 5 that represents W˜(µ; τ) as a function of µ
when γ ≥ γ̂(β, k).
The story becomes richer when γ < γ̂(β, k). In this case, the economy can be in all types
26Since we assume that τ is given at this moment, we use k and γ instead of k(τ1, τ2) and γ(τ1, τ3), and
drop −(τ1 + τ2 + τ3) terms in (18).
34
of equilibria depending on µ. By the similar arguments above, W˜(µ; τ) is monotonically
decreasing in µ for all µ ≥ µγ. Substituting the expression of α and pi from proposition 1
into W˜(µ; τ), we obtain
W˜c(µ; τ) = u(xγ)− xγ − µ
β
γxγ
xγ − γ for all µ ∈ [β, µγ).
First, taking derivatives the above expression with respect to µ and solving, we get
∂W˜c
∂µ
=
µ− β
β
∂xγ
∂µ
− γxγ
β(xγ − γ) < 0,
so W˜(µ; τ) is decreasing in µ for all µ ∈ [β, µγ). Second, by using the expression −µγβ
x2γ
xγ−γ +
u(xγ) = −k + u
(
βk
µγ
)
, from (17), we obtain
W˜c(µγ; τ)− W˜t(µγ; τ) = µγ − β
β
(
xγ − β
µγ
k
)
> 0
because xγ >
β
µγ
k. Thus, there is a jump in W˜(µ; τ) at µ = µγ as depicted in the right panel
of Figure 5 when γ < γ̂(β, k).
It seems worthwhile to spend a little time on the multiplicity of equilibrium when γ =
γ̂(β, k). In this knife edge case, we simply assumed that the economy is in the threat of
counterfeiting equilibrium in propositions 1 and 2. However, in principle both equilibria are
possible, and more interestingly, given the same counterfeiting environment and the same
inflation rate at µγ, the economy with counterfeiting achieves higher welfare than the one
where counterfeits do not circulate. This is because the economy that admits counterfeiting
supports greater trade size in the DM . However, one should not interpret this result as that
counterfeiting improves welfare by working as liquidity provision. Counterfeiting occurs as
a strategic outcome. Welfare is higher if counterfeiting was not possibility.
Perhaps the most interesting result in Figure 5 is that W˜(µ; τ) is monotonically decreas-
ing in µ for all cases: γ R γ̂(β, k). Thus, optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule
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independent of anti-counterfeiting policy, which is re-emphasized as the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule independent of anti-counterfeiting
policy: µ∗(τ) = β for all τ ∈ R3+.
The proposition that the Friedman rule is optimal is very robust in monetary theory.27
Conventional logic for this statement is that the Friedman rule makes an inter-temporal cost
of holding money zero, so it maximizes the trade surplus, u(x)−x, in the DM by supporting
the efficient amount of trade, x∗. In our model, when γ ≥ γ̂(β, k) and hence counterfeiting
does not occur for all µ ≥ β, the Friedman rule is optimal in this conventional way.
The rationale behind the Friedman rule, however, is quite different when γ < γ̂(β, k). In
the counterfeiting equilibrium, a decrease in inflation increases the quantity of goods traded
in the DM , xγ, by reducing the cost of holding money. Furthermore, welfare also increases
as inflation falls (see the right panel of Figure 5). Thus, is the Friedman rule optimal because
it maximizes the trade surplus? The consumption in the DM when µ = β is strictly higher
than the efficient level x∗ (see lemma 4), which implies xγ > x∗ with µ ≈ β. Thus, lowering µ
near β decreases the trade surplus, u(xγ)−xγ. Then, why does the Friedman rule maximize
welfare here? This is because as the inflation rate µ falls, the measure of buyers who commit
forgery decreases as described in Figure 4, so does the welfare costs from counterfeiting.
We are now ready to find the optimal government policy (µ∗, τ ∗) by maximizingW(µ∗(τ), τ).
By proposition 3, it suffices to let µ∗(τ) = β to find τ ∗. However, to obtain more general
idea, we take the monetary policy µ as given and find τ ∗(µ) in a similar way to derive
µ∗(τ). To analyze the effects of τ on welfare, one has to consider the agents’ optimal behav-
iors that determine the equilibrium type. More precisely, the maximized welfare given µ is
W∗(τ ;µ) = Max {W∗t (µ),W∗c (µ)} where
(Pt) W∗t (µ) = max
τ∈R3+
{
u
(
βk(τ1, τ2)
µ
)
− βk(τ1, τ2)
µ
− τ1 − τ2 − τ3
}
27There are some papers, however, that study conditions where deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal
in monetary models (see, e.g., Sanches and Williamson 2010).
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subject to
(19) u
(
βk(τ1, τ2)
µ
)
− k(τ1, τ2) ≥ u(xγ)− µ
β
x2γ
xγ − γ
and
(Pc) W∗c (µ) = max
τ∈R3+
{
u(xγ)− xγ − µ
β
γxγ
xγ − γ − τ1 − τ2 − τ3
}
subject to
(20) u(xγ)− µ
β
x2γ
xγ − γ ≥ u
(
βk(τ1, τ2)
µ
)
− k(τ1, τ2).
The constraint (19) is the condition for the economy to be in the threat of counterfeiting
equilibrium whereas the constraint (20) is the condition for the existence of the counterfeiting
equilibrium.
Let τ t(µ) and τ c(µ) be a solution of (Pt) and (Pc) respectively. Then, optimal anti-
counterfeiting policy given µ, τ ∗(µ), is
τ ∗(µ) =
 τ
t(µ) if W∗t (µ) ≥ W∗c (µ)
τ c(µ) if W∗t (µ) <W∗c (µ).
Whether W∗t (µ) T W∗c (µ) and the form of τ ∗(µ) depend on particular functions of
k(τ1, τ2), γ(τ1, τ3), and u(x). However, a certain rule of optimal anti-counterfeiting policy
can be found by making two observations. First, welfare under the threat of counterfeiting
equilibrium depends on the counterfeiting cost but not on the screening cost. Lowering the
screening cost only makes the constraint (19) tighter. Thus, any solution to (Pt) must fea-
ture τ3 = 0 because the objective function can be increased otherwise. Second, welfare under
the counterfeiting equilibrium, on the other hand, depends on the screening cost but not on
the counterfeiting cost. Increasing the counterfeiting cost only tightens the constraint (20)
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which implies that it must be τ2 = 0 to solve (Pc). Therefore, the government should focus
on either increasing the counterfeiting cost or decreasing the screening cost, so the optimal
anti-counterfeiting policy is dichotomous which is formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 If τ ∗(µ) = τ t(µ), then τ ∗3 (µ) = 0, whereas if τ
∗(µ) = τ c(µ), then τ ∗2 (µ) = 0.
After deriving τ ∗(µ), the optimal government policy is simply given by (β, τ ∗(β)) by
virtue of proposition 3. The structure of (β, τ ∗) hinges on a form of cost functions and agent’s
preference. For example, if lim
τ1→0
k1 = ∞ and lim
τ1→0
γ1 = −∞, then the optimal government
policy (β, τ ∗) features τ ∗1 > 0 in all cases, W∗t R W∗c , which means that security features
must always be incorporated into banknotes. Observe that whenever τ ∗ = τ c(β), counterfeits
circulate in the economy under the optimal government policy.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed a search theoretic model of money to analyze how coun-
terfeiting affects economic activity and to study optimal government policy. We have shown
that there are three types of equilibria when an economy is susceptible to counterfeiting.
When the cost of counterfeiting is high enough, the incentive to produce fake money does
not exist. When the counterfeiting cost is not too high but the screening cost is relatively
high, then the potential threat of counterfeiting generates a resalability constraint on money
thereby affecting the allocation, but there are still no counterfeits in equilibrium. Finally,
when both the counterfeiting cost and the screening cost are sufficiently low, counterfeiting
occurs in equilibrium. We also show that it is more likely, in this economy, that counterfeiting
occurs when inflation is low because of its effects on the value of money.
We also used the model to provide implications for government policy. First, the Friedman
rule is optimal independent of anti-counterfeiting policy. When counterfeits do not exist in
equilibrium, the Friedman rule is optimal because it maximizes the trade surplus. We add
new insight here: When counterfeits do exist in equilibrium, the Friedman rule is optimal
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not because it maximizes the trade surplus but because it minimizes the welfare cost of
counterfeiting. The trade surplus is not maximized with the Friedman rule in this case.
Second, the model suggests that anti-counterfeiting policy must focus on improvement along
one of two dimensions—increasing the counterfeiting cost or decreasing the screening cost—
but not both.
A natural extension of our analysis would be to relax some of the assumptions of our
model. For example, money is the only possible medium of exchanges in the model. In
practice, however, other financial assets, such as government bonds and asset backed se-
curities that are also subject to moral hazard problems, are widely used as a medium of
exchanges. It would be interesting to introduce our description of screening into the coun-
terfeiting model with multiple real assets as in Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012), and study
how anti-counterfeiting policy for a particular asset or the supply of safe assets that are
immune to faking into the economy affects counterfeiting of other types of assets. Another
potentially interesting extension would be to assume that the central bank determines the
rate of confiscation of counterfeits in contrast to 100% confiscation in our model, and to
study how this decision affects counterfeiting and welfare.
1.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which the buyer accumulates
mt units of legal money and m
c
t units of counterfeits both in terms of CM goods of period
t+1, makes the offer (xt, dt), and hands over d̂t > 0 units of genuine money and d̂
c
t > 0 units
of legal money where d̂t + d̂
c
t = dt. Then, given u(x
s
t)− βdst = 0, the buyer’s payoff is
Sbt = −
(
φt
φt+1
− β
)
mt − k + I{r=A}(1− I{s=Y })
[
u(xt)− βd̂t
]
.
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Now consider another set of actions such that m′ = mt − d̂t, d̂′ = 0, and d̂c′ = dt, and the
buyer makes the same offer (xt, dt). The buyer’s payoff with this choice of actions is
Sb′t = S
b
t +
{
φt
φt+1
− β [1− I{r=A}(1− I{s=Y })]} d̂t > Sbt ,
so we get a contradiction. Thus, it must be dt = d̂t or dt = d̂
c
t . The proof of remaining parts
is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2. We first prove that for any solution to (P ), pi < 1. Suppose pi = 1
which requires α ∈ (0, 1) by (5). Then, substituting the indifference condition (4) to the
objective function, we obtain S
b
= −k < 0, a contradiction. Next, note that whenever
α = 1, it must be pi = 0 by (5). Finally, we show that for any solution to (P ), α ∈ (0, 1) if
and only if pi ∈ (0, 1). The “if ” part is trivial so we focus on proving the “only if ” part by
showing a contradiction otherwise. Suppose there exists a solution (x, d, α, η, pi) of (P ) with
α < 1 but pi = 0. Then, the indifference condition to have α ∈ (0, 1) is [µ− (1− η)β] d = k.
Now, consider d′ = αd < d, so [µ− (1− η)β] d′ < k. Then, (x, d′, α′ = 1, η, pi′ = 0) satisfies
constraints (4) and (5), and attains higher value of the objective function than (x, d, α, η, pi),
a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. 1) We first prove that η = 1. To find a contradiction, suppose there
exists a solution (x, d, η, α, pi) of (P ) with η < 1. Since pi[(1−α)x−γ] = 0 with any solution
by lemma 2, the indifference condition to have η ∈ (0, 1) is x = αβd. Assume that α = 1
so pi = 0 and x = βd. Consider η′ = η +  < 1 and d′ = d − δ > 0 where δ = βd
µ−β+(η+)β ,
so lim
→0
δ = 0. Let x′ = βd′. Then, (x′, d′, α′ = 1, η′, pi′ = 0) satisfies constraints (4) and (5).
However, the change in the objective function is
4Sb = η′u(x′)− ηu(x)
≈ (η + )
{
u(x)− u′(x) βx
µ− β + β(η + )
}
− ηu(x) > 0
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with sufficiently small  > 0. Therefore, for the solution with η < 1 to exist, it must be that
α ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1). Now consider η′ = η +  and pi′ = pi − δ where δ = [piu(x)−βd]
(+η)u(x)
.
Since η ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1), there exists sufficiently small  > 0 such that η′ ∈ (0, 1) and
pi′ ∈ (0, 1). Then, (x, d, η′, α, pi′) satisfies all constraints in (P ) but delivers higher value of
the objective function, a contradiction.
2) If x > αβd, then η = 0 given the result of lemma 2. Thus, to prove x = αβd, suppose
there exists a solution (x, d, η, α, pi) of (P ) with x < αβd. Assume α = 1. Then, there exists
d′ < d such that x < βd′. Then, (x, d′, η, α, pi) satisfies (4) and (5) but attains higher value
of the objective function. Thus, the only possible case with x < αβd is that α ∈ (0, 1) and
pi ∈ (0, 1). In this case, we can find x′ > x, α′ > α, and pi′ < pi such that 1) x′ < α′βd, 2)
pi′u(x′) = piu(x), and 3) (1− α′)x′ = γ. Then, given (x′, d), (η, α′, pi′) is consistent with (4)
and (5), but (x′, d, η, α′, pi′) gives higher value of the objective function, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Rearranging (7), (11), and (12), we get d = x
2
β(x−γ) , α = 1 − γx , and
pi = 1
u(x)
{
µ
β
x2
x−γ − k
}
. Substituting the expression for d into the objective function of (P ′),
we obtain −µ
β
x2
x−γ + u(x). This is a strictly concave function for all x > γ, which must be
satisfied to have α > 0. Then, we get the first order condition with respect to x that is (13).
Because the right hand side of (13) is negative with x < 2γ, we can restrict attention to
x > 2γ. Note that the right hand side of (13) is a decreasing function of xγ, and tends to ∞
as xγ → 2γ, and to 0 as xγ → ∞. Thus, there exists unique xγ ∈ (2γ,∞) that solves (13).
Furthermore, because (x−γ)
2
x(x−2γ)u
′(x) > u′(x) for all x > 2γ, xγ > u′−1
(
µ
β
)
. Next, for xγ to be
the candidate solution, it must be that α ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1). First, because xγ > 2γ,
α ∈ (1
2
, 1) for all γ > 0. Second, because xγ > u
′−1
(
µ
β
)
, pi > 0 given the assumption that
k < µ
β
u′−1
(
µ
β
)
. Finally, given −µ
β
x2γ
xγ−γ + u(xγ) ≥ 0, pi < 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since we already characterized a solution of (P ), we only prove
that equilibrium can be characterized by solving (P ). Given a solution (x, d, α, η, pi), sup-
pose {α, [η, pi]} is a unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of the subgame Γ(x, d). Then
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(x, d, α, η, pi) is an equilibrium outcome by construction of (P ). Also, any equilibrium must
solve (P ) because the buyer can attain higher payoff by posting (x, d) that solves (P ) oth-
erwise. Thus, it suffices to show that if (x, d, α, η, pi) is a solution to (P ), then {α, [η, pi]} is
the unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of Γ(x, d).
Suppose (x, d, α, η, pi) solves (P ). As argued above, x > 0 and η = 1. Thus, any Nash
equilibrium {α′, [η′, pi′]} of Γ(x, d) with α′ = 0 is Pareto dominated by {α, [η, pi]} because it
must be that η′ = 0. Since any solution to (P ) has either α = 1 or α ∈ (0, 1), we consider
each case separately.
1) First, suppose that α = 1 so pi = 0. Thus, it must be µd ≤ k and x = βd. Consider
any Nash equilibrium {α′, [η′, pi′]} 6= {α, [η, pi]} of Γ(x, d). i) Assume α′ = 1. Then, the
only Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is with η′ < 1, so {α′, [η′, pi′]} is Pareto dominated by
{α, [η, pi]}. ii) Assume α′ ∈ (0, 1) which requires µd− (1− η′)βd = k+ η′pi′u(x) by (4). This
is possible only if µd = k with η′ = 1 and pi′ = 0. However, if pi′ = 0, then it must be η′ = 0
because −x + α′βd < 0, a contradiction. Therefore, if α = 1 and pi = 0, then {α, [η, pi]} is
the unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of the subgame Γ(x, d).
2) Second, suppose that α ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1). Then, it must be µd = k + piu(x),
(1 − α)x = γ, and x = αβd. Now consider any Nash equilibrium {α′, [η′, pi′]} 6= {α, [η, pi]}
of Γ(x, d). i) Suppose α′ ∈ (α, 1]. Then, the best response of the seller is η′ = 1 and pi′ = 0.
But the buyer’s best response is, then, α′ = 0, because µd > k, a contradiction. ii) Consider
the case that α′ = α. If η′ < 1, {α′, [η′, pi′]} is Pareto dominated by {α, [η, pi]}, and hence
assume η′ = 1. However, the only Nash equilibrium with α′ = α and η′ = 1 is with pi′ = pi,
a contradiction. iii) Finally, assume α′ ∈ (0, α). By the same reason above, assume η′ = 1.
Then, it must be α′βd − α′x − γ ≥ 0 with pi′ = 1. Otherwise η′ = 0 because α′ < α.
However, if (η′, pi′) = (1, 1), then α′ = 1 because µd < k + u(x), a contradiction. Therefore,
if α ∈ (0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1), then {α, [η, pi]} is the unique Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium
of the subgame Γ(x, d).
42
Chapter 2
Central Bank Purchases of Private As-
sets: An Evaluation
2.1 Introduction
In response to the Great Recession and its aftermath, the Fed embarked on unconventional
monetary policy in the form of large-scale asset purchases, also known as quantitative easing
(QE). Through successive rounds of QE, the Fed purchased, over time, long term govern-
ment bonds, agency debt, and mortgage backed securities (MBS), dramatically increasing
the size of the Fed’s balance sheet.28 These unconventional policy actions have generated
a substantial debate in the economics profession about the effects of QE on market inter-
est rates and the real economy. Yet the precise mechanism through which QE has affected
economic activities is still not well understood.29 The following questions still need to be
addressed: How does unconventional monetary policy affect market interest rates, the incen-
tive structure of the private sector, and real economic activities? What is the relationship
between conventional and unconventional monetary policy? Can unconventional monetary
policy substitute a conventional monetary policy? Is there any risk of implementing QE,
and under what conditions does it improve or lower welfare?
In this paper we attempt to deal with the above questions by constructing a New Mone-
tarist model.30 More precisely, we study the effects of the central bank’s purchases of private
assets such as MBS by incorporating housing construction and asymmetric information con-
28During the periods from 2008 to 2014, the overall size of the Fed’s balance sheet increased more than
five times (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release H.4.1).
29Moreover, most empirical studies focused on the effects of QE on yield spreads without proper attention
to its effects on real economic activities (See Williams 2011 for the survey of empirical studies).
30A discussion of the New Monetarist approach is in Williamson and Wright (2010, 2011) and Lagos et al.
(forthcoming), and a textbook treatment is in Nosal and Rocheteau (2011).
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cerning the quality of private financial assets in a model of asset exchange. In the model, the
central bank’s private asset purchases can relax the incentive problem faced by private banks
but, at the same time, the quantity of the central bank’s private asset purchases is limited
by the incentive problem. Furthermore, the effects of the private asset purchase program
on macroeconomic activities and welfare crucially depend on the severity of the incentive
problem.
In the model, there is a fundamental role for exchange using currency and exchange with
secured credit in a decentralized market, as a result of limited commitment and lack of record
keeping. Then, in equilibrium financial intermediation is a type of insurance arrangement
by which banks efficiently allocate liquid assets, in the form of currency and a claim on a
bank, to the appropriate transactions. However, banks are inherently untrustworthy. Limited
commitment implies that banks face collateral constraints, according to which banks’ deposit
liabilities must be secured by other financial assets.
Primitive assets in the model are government liabilities (currency, reserves, and nominal
government bonds) and houses constructed by private agents. Though houses cannot be
directly used as a collateral by banks, houses are useful in exchange in the decentralized
market indirectly. Homeowners can take out mortgages with banks using residential prop-
erties as collateral, and then banks can pledge mortgage loans as collateral to secure their
deposit claims. However, the usefulness of mortgages as collateral is limited by the threat of
fraud. More precisely, banks can produce fake mortgage loans and post them as collateral
at a cost. This generates an incentive problem faced by banks similar to Li, Rocheteau, and
Weill (2012) and Williamson (2016), though there are key differences in the nature of the
incentive problem.
We first study the effects of conventional monetary policy determining a nominal interest
rate of short-maturity government bonds, on equilibrium quantities, prices, and welfare.
In particular, we show that a zero nominal interest rate is optimal, at least locally, if the
bank’s incentive constraint binds with the low fraud cost, whereas it could be suboptimal if
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the incentive constraint does not bind. This is because when the incentive constraint does
not bind, lowering a nominal interest rate causes a housing construction boom above the
efficient level, but conventional monetary policy does not affect the housing market when
the incentive constraint binds.
Next, We examine the effects of QE as unconventional monetary policy. In the model, the
central bank purchases mortgage loans from banks at the market price.31 Unlike conventional
monetary policy, QE has effects on the economy only if the bank’s incentive constraint
binds and a rate of return differential exists between government bonds and mortgages. In
this economy, government bonds and reserves act to discourage fraud by making default
more costly.32 Thus, the central bank’s exchange of reserves for mortgages mitigates the
incentive problem in the banking sector, and lowers the yield spread between mortgages
and government bonds, consistent with the empirical findings of Hancock and Passmore
(2011). In particular, the central bank can make the incentive constraint slack by purchasing
a sufficient quantity of mortgages. However, the effects of the central bank’s mortgage
purchases on real allocations and welfare depend on whether the collateral constraint binds,
which, in turn, hinges on the cost of fraud.
First, if the cost of fraud is below some threshold level, the bank’s collateral constraint
does not bind, and only the incentive constraint binds. In this case, the incentive problem
is so severe that there are illiquid mortgages that are not used as collateral. Under QE, the
central bank purchases these illiquid mortgages in exchange for reserves, and the quantity of
trading in the decentralized market increases as a result. However, the central bank’s mort-
gage purchases do not affect the mortgage price, housing price, and housing construction,
because mortgages are illiquid at the margin. Therefore, in this equilibrium, the central
bank’s mortgage purchases unambiguously improve welfare.
Second, when the cost of fraud is above the threshold level, the bank’s collateral con-
31Throughout this article, QE and the central bank’s mortgage purchases are considered synonymous.
32Carapella and Williamson (2015) show a similar result that the introduction of government debt dis-
courages default on an unsecured loan in a limited commitment model.
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straint and incentive constraint both bind. In this case, the central bank’s mortgage pur-
chases have different effects on these two binding constraints. An increase of central bank’s
mortgage purchases tightens the binding collateral constraint because of the rate of return
difference, which forces the quantity of exchange to fall. On the other hand, mortgage pur-
chases relax the incentive constraint, which raises the quantity of exchange. In addition, the
central bank’s mortgage purchases boost investment in housing construction in the private
sector, which increases the aggregate quantity of collateralizable assets. On net, it is not
clear whether trades in the decentralized market increase or decrease when the central bank
increases mortgage purchases. The effects on welfare are also ambiguous. Central bank
mortgage purchases can lower welfare even when the quantity of exchange increases in the
decentralized market, because mortgage purchases cause too much investment in housing
construction. Under some circumstances, it is optimal for the central bank not to implement
QE.
To be sure, there has been other research that studies the effects of QE theoretically.
For example, Curdia and Woodford (2011), Del Negro et al. (2011), Gertler and Karadi
(2011, 2013), and Gertler et al. (2012) quantitatively study the effects of QE by extending
a standard New Keynesian model to include financial frictions. In their model, the central
bank directly invests in private assets under “QE” that looks more like a credit market
intervention by the fiscal authority. Boel and Waller (2015) and Williamson (2015, 2016,
forthcoming) studied QE as asset purchases by the central bank much like the Fed’s policy
intervention in the United States. In their model, QE has effects on the economy by changing
the composition of exchangeable assets in the private sector.
Most of those studies focused on the channel under which QE spurs economic activity
without a consideration of its potential risk and welfare costs.33 Gu and Haslag (2014)
constructed an overlapping generations model and examined the effects of the central bank’s
private debt purchase when verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt
33Though New Keynesian models assumed an exogenous welfare cost of the central bank’s direct lending,
they are silent about where this welfare cost comes from.
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settlements lead to a liquidity problem. They are interested in related issues, but approach
the problem in a very different way. Williamson (2015) studied conditions under which an
increase of the central bank’s balance sheet with purchases of government bonds can lower
welfare, but he did not examine the effects of private asset purchases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment of the
model. Section 3 solves economic agents’ problems, section 4 characterizes equilibrium. In
section 5, we study the effects of monetary policy. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2.2 The Environment
The basic structure in the model is built on Lagos and Wright (2005) with heterogeneous
agents similar to Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Time is
indexed by t = 0, 1, 2 . . ., and there are two subperiods within each period; the centralized
market (CM) followed by the decentralized market (DM).
There exists a continuum of buyers, sellers, and bankers each with unit mass. Each buyer
has preference given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[Xt + υ(ft)−Ht + u(xt)],
each seller has preference given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[Xt −Ht − ht],
and the preference of bankers who run banks is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [Xt −Ht] .
Here, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount rate, Xt and Ht are consumption and labor supply, respec-
tively, in the CM , ft is consumption of housing services in the CM , xt is consumption in the
DM , and ht is labor supply in the DM . We assume that u(·) is a strictly increasing, strictly
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concave, and twice continuously differentiable function with u(0) = 0, u′(0) =∞, u′(∞) = 0,
−xu′′(x)
u′(x) < 1 for all x ≥ 0, and with the property that there exists some x̂ such that u(x̂) = x̂.
Let x∗ denote the efficient quantity, which solves u′(x∗) = 1. The utility for housing services
is increasing and concave with υ′(0) =∞, υ′(∞) = 0, and −f υ′′(f)
υ′(f) ≤ 1 for all f ≥ 0.
The production technology of consumption goods available to buyers, sellers, and bankers
allows the production of one unit of the perishable consumption good for each unit of labor
supply. In addition to the linear production technology for consumption goods, there is a
technology to construct houses. Though it does not matter for the equilibrium analysis, we
assume that only sellers can access the construction technology: Sellers, in the CM , can
produce I units of new houses at cost of χ(I) units of CM goods, and houses are traded
at the price ψt in terms of the CM goods at a competitive market in the CM of period
t. We assume that χ(·) is a strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice continuously
differentiable function with χ(0) = χ′(0) = 0 and χ′(∞) =∞. Each unit of housing provides
y units of housing services at the beginning of the CM and housing services can be traded in
a competitive rental market at the price Rt in terms of CM goods in period t.
34 We assume
that houses depreciate by 100% after yielding housing services. We make this assumption to
simplify the welfare analysis with a welfare measure that is widely used in a money search
model, but the equilibrium characterization and main welfare implications do not hinge on
this assumption.35
As well, homeowners can borrow in the form of a mortgage from a bank using houses as
collateral in the CM . A mortgage is a promise to pay one unit of CM goods in the CM
34As explained in Branch, Petrosky-Nadeau, and Rocheteau (forthcoming), given the existence of the
rental market for housing services, a house can be interpreted as a Lucas tree that pays a rent, which makes
our analysis similar to the one in Lagos (2010), Rocheteau (2011), and Rocheteau and Wright (2013) where
a Lucas tree yields the numeraire CM goods as a dividend.
35Following a standard approach in Lagos and Wright (2005) setups, we use the sum of expected utilities
across agents in a steady state equilibrium with equal weight as our welfare measure when we conduct a
welfare analysis. However, if the house does not depreciate by 100%, we need to derive all agents’ value
functions with dynamic programming considering the law of motion of housing stock, and impose equilibrium
quantities in a steady state equilibrium into the value functions for welfare analysis. Thus, we cannot use
our simple welfare measure. In order to avoid distraction associated with this problem and to focus on the
central issues we wish to address here, we assume that the house depreciates by 100% every period.
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of period t + 1 and is traded at the price of qt in units of the CM goods in period t. In
the real world, mortgage loans are often packaged by financial institutions or government
sponsored enterprises into MBS to improve marketability in a financial market. We could
indeed introduce this step into the model, but for our purposes this is a detail. From banks’
perspective, mortgage loans and MBS are the same, so we interpret mortgages as MBS
whenever needed. For example, we treat mortgages as an example of ABS, and we explore
the effects of the central bank’s purchase of mortgages from private banks.
In addition to houses and mortgages, there are three other assets supplied by the govern-
ment: currency, reserves, and nominal government bonds. Currency is a perfectly divisible
and portable object that is supplied by the government at the beginning of the CM with a
lump-sum transfer τt to each buyer. Let φt denote the price of currency in the CM of period
t, in terms of the CM goods. Reserves are account balances with the central bank that can
be acquired in exchange for zmt units of currency in the CM of period t, and each unit of
reserves pays off one unit of currency in the CM of period t + 1. A nominal government
bond sells at a price zt in the CM of period t in units of currency, and pays off one unit
of currency in the CM of period t + 1. In principle, the prices of government bonds and
reserves, zt and z
m
t respectively, could be different in the CM . However, if both assets are
held in an equilibrium that we consider in this paper, their prices must be identical because
both assets are perfect substitutes.36 Thus, we impose this condition from now on: zmt = zt.
At the beginning of the CM , all debts are paid off first. Then, the housing rental market
opens and houses provide housing services to residents. In the CM , there is a centralized
Walrasian market in which agents trade numeraire CM goods and assets. In the DM , there
are bilateral meetings between buyers and sellers. We assume that a buyer makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer in a pairwise meeting in the DM .37 In this economy there is no memory
36We include reserves though government bonds and reserves are identical because central bank private
asset purchases may be infeasible otherwise.
37There are many ways to split the surplus from trade, including Nash bargaining, competitive search,
or competitive pricing (see Rocheteau and Wright 2005). Take-it-or-leave-it offers is a special case of Nash
bargaining, and is equivalent to competitive pricing given that the seller’s utility is linear in labor. Allowing
general bargaining rule in the DM does not appear to admit any important insight, and we use take-it-or-
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or recordkeeping, so that in any meeting, traders have no knowledge of each other’s history.
Also, no one can be forced to work, so lack of memory implies that there can be no unsecured
credit. Hence, an asset is essential for trade to occur.
In a manner of Willamson (2012), we assume limitations on the information technology
in a following way: In a fraction ρ of DM meetings, a buyer will be in a currency transaction
in which he will be matched with a seller who does not have the information technology to
verify that the buyer possesses any assets other than currency. Otherwise, in a fraction 1−ρ
of DM transactions – denoted non-currency transactions – the seller can verify the entire
portfolio of financial assets and currency held by the buyer. At the beginning of the CM,
buyers do not know what type of match (currency or non-currency transaction) they will
have in the subsequent DM , but they learn this at the end of the CM, after all production
and consumption decisions have taken place. We assume that the type of match in the DM
is private information.
In this environment, banks can play a useful role by efficiently allocating liquid assets to
appropriate types of transactions as pointed out in Williamson (2012): The bank’s deposit
contract will essentially allocate currency only to currency transactions, and other assets to
non-currency transactions, while providing insurance to buyers, in the spirit of Diamond-
Dybvig (1983). In order to prevent the banking contracts from being unwound, we assume
that after a buyer learns his type at the end of the CM , he can meet at most one bank and
a bank can contact buyers one-by-one.38
Fraud on asset backed securities (ABS) One important feature of ABS is that it is
difficult to pierce the veil of ABS and learn exactly what lies behind the asset because of
the complicated structure of securitization (see Gorton and Metrick 2012). This lack of
recognizability problem in ABS markets caused incentive problems in the financial sector
such as fraudulent asset appraisals with rating deficiencies, false documentation about the
leave-it assumption for tractability.
38Without this spatial separation assumption at the end of CM , the possibility of side trades can unwind
bank deposit contracts. See Jacklin (1987) for more information.
50
underlying assets, and lax screening of borrowers without due diligence. These kinds of
fraudulent practices were criticized as key factors in the financial crisis of 2008 (see Barnett
2012, Gourinchas and Jeanne 2012, Keys et al. 2010, and The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report 2011).39
We incorporate the incentive problem related to ABS in the model in a very simple way.
First, a private bank is able to produce any quantity of fake mortgages in the CM . In order
to use these fake mortgages to secure deposit liabilities, the bank must incur a fixed cost
of k > 0 for each deposit contract. In the real world, the cost of cheating may include a
proportional cost. However, adding a proportional cost does not affect the main result of
analysis, so we focus on the fixed cost for simplicity.40 Second, any securities, if they exist,
that are fully or partially backed by mortgages can be faked and posted as collateral by
banks without any cost, which implies that those types of ABS cannot be used as collateral
to secure bank’s deposit contracts.41
Similarly, we assume that fraud can occur in the transaction between private banks
and the central bank when the central bank is willing to purchase mortgages from banks.
Specifically, a private bank can produce any quantity of fake mortgages and sell them to the
central bank at a fixed cost of kc > 0. Note that kc can be different from k. There are several
reasons that the cost of fraud could be different when the bank deceives the central bank
than when it tricks depositors. For example, the Fed only purchases MBS from its member
banks that are guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, and mortgages
39Robert Lucas, in his interview with the Wall Street Journal (Sep. 24, 2011) also emphasized this
fraudulent practice in the financial market as the key factor of the financial crisis arguing that “Instead, the
shock came because complex mortgage-related securities minted by Wall Street and “certified as safe” by
rating agencies had become part of the effective liquidity supply of the system. All of a sudden, a whole
bunch of this stuff turns out to be crap. It is the financial aspect that was instrumental in the meltdown of
’08.”
40Note that the fixed cost k occurs when the bank uses fake mortgages as collateral. If the bank has to
incur a fixed cost to produce fake mortgages and can post fake mortgages as collateral without any cost as in
Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012), then counterfeiting cost for each deposit contract converges to zero because
the bank makes deposit contracts with continuum of buyers in equilibrium. Thus, mortgages cannot be used
as collateral.
41We make this assumption because banks could circumvent the incentive problem on mortgages by cre-
ating a new security backed by mortgages otherwise.
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underlying those MBS must undergo more strict screening and a careful approval process.
Thus, it is quite conceivable that it would be more difficult for banks to cheat the Fed than
depositors about the quality of MBS.
2.3 Economic Agents’ problems
2.3.1 Bank’s Problem
In the CM , a bank writes deposit contracts with buyers when consumption and production
decisions are made, but before buyers learn what the type of their transaction (currency or
non-currency) will be in the subsequent DM . A bank’s deposit contract consists of three
components: [κt, ct, dt]. This contract specifies that if the buyer deposits κt units of the CM
goods with a bank in the CM of period t, the bank gives the depositor one of two options.
First, the depositor can withdraw ct units of currency in terms of the CM goods in period t,
and have no other claims on the bank. Second, if the depositor does not withdraw currency,
the bank gives a claim to dt units of the CM goods in the CM of period t + 1, and this
claim is tradeable in the intervening DM .
Like all other agents, the bank is also subject to limited commitment, in that the bank
borrows from depositors in the CM , and promises to give currency at the end of the current
CM and the CM goods in the CM of the next period. Thus, the bank must collateralize
its deposit liabilities. First, we assume that there is a strong commitment device such as
ATM in which the bank can lock up currency, when it acquires its asset portfolio, to satisfy
cash withdrawals. Second, the bank’s deposit claims must be secured by government bonds,
reserves, and mortgages.42 Further, we assume that any agents can observe the balance
sheet of any banks. Thus, if a buyer (a depositor) suspects that the bank has not acquired
42Here, we implicitly assume that banks cannot pledge houses as collateral. If banks can pledge houses as
collateral, then banks can circumvent the incentive problem by owning the house, pledging it as collateral,
and renting it. However, if banks can pledge fake houses as collateral in a same with mortgages, we get the
same results.
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appropriate collateral for his deposit contract in the CM , the buyer can withdraw the initial
deposit κt and go to another bank before the realization of the buyer’s transaction type in
the DM . However, we assume that a buyer can leave the CM with a maximum of one
deposit contract.43
In equilibrium, the bank maximizes the expected utility of its representative depositor,
subject to the non-negative profit constraint for the bank, the collateral constraint, and the
incentive constraint. In the bank’s problem below, we explicitly consider the possibility that
the bank might not pledge all assets in its balance sheet as collateral. Let σbt , σ
m
t , and σ
denote the fraction of government bonds, reserves, and mortgages, respectively, in the bank’s
balance sheet that are pledged as collateral by the bank. Because government bonds and
reserves are perfect substitutes, we assume that σbt = σ
m
t without loss of generality.
Then, in equilibrium, the bank solves the following problem, by virtue of quasi-linearity
of preferences, in the CM of period t:
(P) Λt = Max
κt,ct,dt,bt,mt,lt,σbt ,σt
{
−κt + ρu
(
βφt+1ct
φt
)
+ (1− ρ)u (βdt)
}
43If there is no restriction on the number of deposits with which a buyer can enter to the DM , then the
buyer can circumvent the faking incentive problem in the banking sector in a following way. First, the buyer
can make a deposit contract with small dt that is backed by sufficiently small quantity of mortgages, so a
bank has no incentive to post fake mortgages at the fixed cost k. Second, the buyer can satisfy his liquidity
needs by making that deposit contract with sufficiently many banks.
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subject to
κt − ρct − zt(bt +mt)− qtlbt − β(1− ρ)dt + β
φt+1
φt
(bt +mt) + βl
b
t ≥ 0(21)
−β(1− ρ)dt + βφt+1
φt
σbt (bt +mt) + βσtl
b
t ≥ 0(22)
−β(1− ρ)dt +
{
β
φt+1
φt
− zt(1− σbt )
}
(bt +mt)− (qt − β) lbt + k ≥ 0(23)
1− σbt ≥ 0(24)
1− σt ≥ 0(25)
κt, ct, dt, bt,mt, at, σ
b
t , σt ≥ 0,(26)
where bt and mt are the real quantities of government bonds and reserves in terms of CM
goods in period t, respectively, acquired by the bank, and lbt is the demand for mortgages.
The objective function in the problem (P) is the expected utility of the depositor. The
buyer deposits κt units of CM goods with the bank in the CM of period t. Then, the
buyer consumes βφt+1ct
φt
units of DM goods in a currency transaction with probability ρ and
consumes βdt units of DM goods in a non-currency transaction with probability 1 − ρ, as
the result of a take-it-or-leave-it offer by the buyer in a DM meeting.
The left hand side of constraint (21) is the net payoff to the bank from banking activity
in the current CM and the next CM . Inequality (22) is the bank’s collateral constraint,
which states that the bank’s deposit liabilities in the CM of period t+ 1 must be lower than
the value of assets pledged as collateral. Inequality (23) is the incentive constraint for the
bank not to post fake mortgages as collateral. This constraint follows from two observations.
First, given the fixed cost of posting fake mortgages as collateral, the bank will pledge either
the quantity of fake mortgages that is necessary to collateralize the equilibrium deposit claim
or no fake mortgages at all. Second, even though the bank can fake the quality of mortgages,
the bank cannot deceive depositors about its holdings of collateral assets. Therefore, the
bank must acquire currency, government bonds, and reserves that are used to secure the
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equilibrium deposit contract to cheat depositors with fake mortgages. Otherwise, the buyer
can detect that the mortgages are fake and withdraw his initial deposit, κt.
44 Thus, the net
payoff from fraud with faking is
(27) κt − ρct − ztσbt (bt +mt)− k,
and the constraint (23) means that the bank’s equilibrium net payoff (21) is higher than
(27).45
In the bank’s problem, it is obvious that (21) must bind, otherwise the bank could increase
the value of the objective function without violating any constraints. Then, guessing that
the constraint (26) does not bind for all choice variables, the first-order conditions for the
bank’s problem are
1 =
βφt+1
φt
u′
(
βφt+1
φt
ct
)
(28)
λ1t + λ2t = u
′(βdt)− 1(29)
zt
[
1 + λ2t(1− σbt )
]
=
βφt+1
φt
[
1 + σbtλ1t + λ2t
]
(30)
qt(1 + λ2t) = β [1 + σtλ1t + λ2t](31)
λ3t =
{
βφt+1
φt
λ1t + ztλ2t
}
(bt +mt)(32)
λ4t = λ1tβl
b
t(33)
where λ1t, λ2t, λ3t, and λ4t are the Lagrange multipliers for (22), (23), (24), and (25) respec-
tively with λit ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
44Basically we are assuming that buyers believe that any deposit contract that is different from the
equilibrium deposit contract with respect to terms of contract and the portfolio of collateral assets comes
from a bank who intends to default on the deposit claim.
45In (27), the bank needs to purchase quantity of government liabilities that are posted as collateral.
Alternatively, we can assume that the bank must purchase the whole quantity of government liabilities in
the balance sheet in equilibrium. In this case, the net payoff from frauds is κt − ρct − zt(bt + mt) − k +
βφt+1
φt
(1− σbt )(bt +mt). However, the results do not change with this alternative specification.
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Quantitative Easing In our model, unconventional monetary policy — quantitative eas-
ing (QE) — takes the form that the central bank purchases lgt units of mortgages at the
market price qt from each private bank. In order not to make the central bank be the victim
of fraud, this mortgage purchase program must satisfy the following incentive constraint
(34) kc ≥ qtlgt ,
so that private banks have no incentive to sell fake mortgages to the central bank. Further,
we assume that private banks are willing to sell lgt units of mortgages to the central bank
given that they are indifferent. Thus, the aggregate quantity of mortgage purchases by the
central bank is lgt given the unit measure assumption.
The constraint (34) will limit the quantity of the central bank’s mortgage purchases, lgt ,
but it does not directly affect the bank’s optimal deposit contract problem. In the following
analysis, we assume that kc = ∞ so banks cannot cheat the central bank in equilibrium.
Later, we study the economy with kc <∞ when we analyze the effects of the central bank’s
mortgage purchases.
2.3.2 Buyer’s Problem
Because of quasi-linearity and the existence of the rental market, it does not matter for the
equilibrium analysis which economic agents have ownership of houses. In this paper, we
assume that buyers hold all houses in the economy.
Let Wt(at, lt−1) be the value function for a buyer when he enters the CM of period
t holding at units of houses and lt−1 units of mortgages. Then, using quasi-linearity of
preferences, the value function is
Wt(at, lt−1) =

Rtat − lt−1 + τt + Λt +Max
abt≥0
{
υ(yabt)−Rtabt
}
+ Max
at+1,lbt≥0
{−ψtat+1 + qtlt + βWt+1(at+1, lt)}

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where Λt is the buyer’s value with the equilibrium deposit contract given in the bank’s
problem (P), abt is housing service consumption, at+1 is the quantity of houses taken out of
the CM in period t, and lt is the amount of mortgages borrowed in period t. As is common
in most Lagos and Wright (2005) setups, abt , at+1, lt, and Λt do not depend on at, lt−1 and
τt.
Now we are ready to find the buyer’s optimal choices for
{
abt , at+1, lt
}
in the CM . First,
optimal housing consumption abt can be obtained by solving the first order condition;
(35) Rt = yυ
′(yabt).
However, at+1 and lt require more details because a mortgage loan must be secured with
houses, otherwise the borrower would default for sure. Using linearity of Wt+1(at+1, lt) with
respect to at+1 and lt, the buyer’s problem can be written as
Max
at+1,lt≥0
{(−ψt + βRt+1) at+1 + (qt − β)lt}
subject to
(36) lt ≤ Rt+1at+1.
Equation (36) is the buyer’s collateral constraint, meaning that the payoff on loans in the
CM of period t + 1 cannot exceed the payoff on the housing collateral. Then, as long as
qt ≥ β, which holds in equilibrium, we obtain the following equilibrium conditions:
lt = Rt+1at+1(37)
ψt = qtRt+1.(38)
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2.3.3 Seller’s problem
In the CM , when a seller produces houses, he takes the housing price ψt as given. Thus, the
seller solves
Max
It≥0
{−χ(It) + ψtIt} ,
which gives
(39) ψt = χ
′(It)
as the first order condition. Then, the aggregate quantity of houses constructed in period t
is It by unit measure assumption.
2.3.4 Government
In our model, the consolidated government consists of the fiscal authority and central bank.
The fiscal authority has the power to collect a lump-sum tax from buyers in the CM . In
addition, the fiscal authority issues one-period nominal government bonds in the CM of
period t in nominal terms and redeems them in the next CM . Let Bt denote the quantity
of newly-issued nominal government bonds held by private agents in the CM of period
t. The central bank issues reserves and currency denoted by Mt and Ct in nominal terms
respectively in the CM of period t, in exchange for government bonds and mortgages through
open market operations. The central bank does not have the power to tax, and it transfers
any income it earns through its operations to the fiscal authority.
We will describe about what the policy rules that the fiscal authority and central bank
follow more explicitly later, but what matters in determining an equilibrium are the consol-
idated government budget constraints, which are given by
(40) φ0 [C0 + z0(B0 +M0)]− q0lg0 = τ0,
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for period t = 0, and
(41) φt [Ct − Ct−1 + zt(Bt +Mt)− (Bt−1 +Mt−1)]− qtlgt + lgt−1 = τt
for all succeeding period t ≥ 1. As one can see from equation (40), we assume that the
economy starts up in period t = 0 with no government debts or central bank liabilities
outstanding.
2.4 Equilibrium
As a preliminary step, we first describe market clearing conditions. In equilibrium, asset
markets must clear in the CM . First, the representative bank’s demands for currency,
government bonds, and reserves are equal to the respective supplies coming from the gov-
ernment:
ρct = φtCt(42)
bt = φtBt(43)
mt = φtMt.(44)
Second, the quantity of mortgages purchased by banks equals the quantity supplied by
buyers:
(45) lt = l
b
t + l
g
t .
Third, buyers’ demand for houses is equal to its supply:
(46) abt = at = At = It−1.
We confine our attention to a stationary equilibrium. By stationarity, we mean that all
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real quantities are constant over time, which implies φt
φt+1
= µ for all t where µ is the gross
inflation rate. Further, from (45), we can think that the central bank is willing to purchase
the fraction θ of aggregate mortgage loans, so lb = (1 − θ)l and lg = θl. Accordingly, θ
represents the intensity of the central bank’s mortgage purchases, and an increase of θ can
be interpreted as more aggressive quantitative easing by the central bank.
In general it will matter a great deal here how the central bank and fiscal authority
interact. For instance, one authority might have a goal of its own, with the other authority
optimizing against that. Here, we adopt something simple. We assume that the fiscal
authority fixes exogenously the real value of the transfer in period 0 by V > 0, i.e., τ0 = V ,
so from (40), and (42)-(44), we obtain
(47) ρc+ z(b+m)− qθl = V ,
where we used lg = θl. Then, transfers after period 0, respond passively to central bank
policy, and the transfer τ that supports this fiscal policy is obtained as
(48) τ =
(
1− 1
µ
)
V + (z − 1)b+m
µ
+ θl
(
1− q
µ
)
,
from (41), (42)-(44), and (47). In this sense, the fiscal policy is fixed, and the job of the
central bank is to optimize treating the fiscal policy rule as given. Thus, in determining an
equilibrium, all we need to take into account is equation (47).
In the model, conventional monetary policy is the choice of a target for a nominal gov-
ernment bond price, z. As well, unconventional monetary policy is setting the fraction θ for
mortgage purchases from private banks. Then, we define a stationary equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 Given fiscal policy V and monetary policies (z, θ), a stationary monetary equi-
librium consists of quantities {C,B,M, c, d,m, b, lb, σb, σ, lg, l, ab, a, A, I, τ}, prices {ψ, q, R},
and gross inflation rate µ such that
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1. given {ψ, q, R}, {ab, a, l} solves the buyer’s problems,
2. given ψ, I solves the seller’s problem,
3. given {q, z}, {c, d,m, b, lb, σb, σ} solves the bank’s problem where lb = (1− θ)l,
4. unconventional monetary policy θ satisfies the incentive constraint (34) where lg = θl,
5. government’s budget constraints (47) and (48) hold,
6. A and I satisfy (46),
7. all markets clear.
It will matter for the determination of equilibrium whether the bank’s collateral con-
straint and incentive constraint bind. Thus, we will consider each of the four relevant cases
in turn: neither the collateral constraint nor the incentive constraint binds; the collateral
constraint binds and the incentive constraint does not; both constraints bind; the incentive
constraint binds and the collateral constraint does not. In the following analysis, we char-
acterize an equilibrium in terms of quantities consumed in the DM : x1 =
βc
µ
and x2 = βd
denote consumptions of each buyer in currency transactions and non-currency transactions,
respectively, in the DM .
2.4.1 Non-binding collateral and incentive constraints
When neither the collateral constraint (22) nor the incentive constraint (23) binds, λ1 = λ2 =
0. Then, we obtain, from (28)-(30), that x1 = u
′−1 (1
z
)
and x2 = x
∗, so consumption in non-
currency transactions, x2, in the DM is efficient and consumption in currency transactions,
x1, in the DM is pinned down by conventional monetary policy, z. Further, λ3 = λ4 = 0
by (32) and (33), so fractions of government bonds (and reserves) and mortgages that are
pledged as collateral, σb and σ respectively, are indetermined between zero and one.
Next, from (31), we get q = β, and then rearranging (35), (38), (39), (46), we obtain
(49) ψ = χ′(A) = βyυ′(yA),
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which uniquely pins down the aggregate housing stock A, and let A∗ denote this value. Given
A = A∗, (35) gives R = yυ′(yA∗). Then, from (37), we obtain the aggregate quantity of
mortgages, l, as
(50) l = yA∗υ′(yA∗) ≡ l∗.
For this to be an equilibrium requires that (22) and (23) hold with inequality. To find
conditions where the collateral constraint and incentive constraint are non-binding, substi-
tute c = µ
β
x1, (30), and equilibrium conditions such as x1 = u
′−1 (1
z
)
, x2 = x
∗, and l = l∗
into (47) to get
β
µ
(b+m) = V − ρu′−1
(
1
z
)
1
z
+ θβl∗.
Then, substituting this expression into (22) and (23) with σb = σ = 1, we obtain the following
necessary condition that neither the collateral constraint nor the incentive constraint binds:
V ≥ V +Max {0, (1− θ)βl∗ − k} ,
where V is given by
(51) V ≡ ρu′−1
(
1
z
)
1
z
+ (1− ρ)x∗ − βl∗.
Non-currency transaction and collateralization of government liabilities As one
can see from (29), consumption in non-currency transactions in the DM is efficient with
x2 = x
∗ if and only if neither the collateral constraint nor the incentive constraint binds so
λ1+λ2 = 0. On the other hand, if one of these two constraints binds or both constraints bind,
the non-currency transaction cannot attain the efficient level x∗. In addition, λ1 + λ2 > 0
implies that σb = 1 because λ3 > 0 by (32). Therefore, whenever consumption in non-
currency transactions in the DM is inefficient, the bank pledges all government bonds and
reserves in its balance sheet as collateral. Then, given σb = 1, we can express x1 as a function
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of x2, from (28)-(30), such that
(52) x1 = u
′−1
(
u′(x2)
z
)
which is increasing in x2 and z. In the following three subsections, we impose the equilibrium
condition σb = 1 in the analysis.
2.4.2 Binding collateral constraint and non-binding incentive con-
straint
In this case, λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. Then, λ4 > 0 by (33), so it must be σ = 1: the bank pledges
all mortgages in its balance sheet as collateral. Then, from (29), (31), (35), (38), (39), and
(46), we obtain
q = βu′(x2)(53)
ψ = βyυ′(yA)u′(x2) = χ′(δA).(54)
Then, equation (54) can be used to express the housing stock A as a function of x2 by
Â : R+ → R+ where Â(x2) satisfies
(55) βyυ′
(
yÂ(x2)
)
u′(x2) = χ′
(
δÂ(x2)
)
.
Similarly, from (35), (37), (46), (54), and (55), we can express mortgage outstanding l as
a function of x2, defined as
(56) l̂(x2) ≡ yÂ(x2)υ′
(
yÂ(x2)
)
.
Simple inspection gives that Â′(x2) < 0, l̂′(x2) < 0 for all x2 > 0, Â(x∗) = A∗, and l̂(x∗) = l∗.
Next, substituting the binding collateral constraint (22), (28)-(30), (53), and (56) into
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(47), we obtain
(57) ρx1u
′(x1) + (1− ρ)x2u′(x2)− βu′(x2)l̂(x2) = V.
Observe that the left-hand side of (57) is strictly increasing in x1 and x2. Then, given fiscal
policy V and conventional monetary policy z, equations (52) and (57) determine equilibrium
consumptions in the DM , (x1, x2). Once we obtain x2, the mortgage price, q, housing price,
ψ, rental rate R, aggregate housing stock, A, and aggregate mortgage loans, l, are given by
(35), and (53)-(56).
The binding collateral constraint and non-binding incentive constraint require, from (22),
(23), and (29), that x2 < x
∗ and k ≥ (1 − θ)ql. First, the condition x2 < x∗ holds if and
only if
V < V
by (52) and (57) where V is defined in equation (51).
Finally, the condition k ≥ (1− θ)ql can be rewritten, using (53) and (56), as
(58) k ≥ (1− θ)βu′(x2)l̂(x2)
where the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in x2. Because it must be x2 < x
∗, the
necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is that the fraud cost k is sufficiently high
such that
(59) k > (1− θ)βl∗.
Given (59), there exists a unique threshold value of x2, denoted by x̂ ∈ (0, x∗), such that
(60) k = (1− θ)βu′(x̂)l̂(x̂),
64
and x̂ satisfies ∂x̂
∂k
< 0 and ∂x̂
∂θ
< 0. Then, the condition (58) holds if and only if x2 ≥ x̂ that
requires, from (52), (57), and (60), that
(61) V ≥ ρu′−1
(
u′(x̂)
z
)
u′(x̂)
z
+ (1− ρ)x̂u′ (x̂)− k
1− θ ≡ V̂ (θ, k).
Notice that V̂ (θ, k) decreases with θ and k because x̂ decreases with θ and k.
2.4.3 Binding collateral and incentive constraints
First, binding collateral constraint means λ1 > 0, so σ = 1 by (33). Then, for the collateral
constraint (22) and the incentive constraint (23) both to bind, it requires k = (1 − θ)ql.
Substituting (37), (38), (39), and (46) into this condition, we obtain
(62) k = (1− θ)χ′(A)A.
Because the right-hand side of (62) strictly increases with A from zero to infinity, there is
unique A = A˜ that solves (62), and A˜ increases with k and θ.
Given A = A˜, (35), (39) and (46) determine the rental rate and the housing price as
R = yυ′(yA˜) and ψ = χ′(δA˜), respectively. Then, from (37) and (38), we obtain the
mortgage price and quantity of mortgage loans as
q =
χ′(δA˜)
yυ′(yA˜)
≡ q˜(63)
l = yυ′(yA˜)A˜ ≡ l˜.(64)
Next, from (22), (28)-(30), (47), and (62)-(64), we obtain
(65) ρx1u
′(x1) + (1− ρ)x2u′(x2)− (1− θ)βl˜u′(x2)− θk
1− θ = V,
and then (52) and (65) solve for x1 and x2, given fiscal policy V and monetary policy (z, θ).
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Finally, for this to be an equilibrium, lagrange multipliers of (22) and (23) must be
positive. From (29), (31), and (63), we obtain
λ1 = u
′(x2)
{
q˜ − β
q˜
}
λ2 =
βu′(x2)− q˜
q˜
.
First, because lim
k→(1−θ)βl∗
A˜ = A∗ and lim
k→(1−θ)βl∗
q˜ = β, λ1 > 0 if and only if (59) holds. Second,
it can be verified, from (55), (56), (60), (62), and (64), that Â (x̂) = A˜ and l̂(x̂) = l˜. Then,
we obtain, from (60), and (62)-(64), that λ2 > 0 if and only if x2 < x̂ which requires, from
(52) and (65), that
V < V̂ (θ, k),
where V̂ (θ, k) is defined in (61).
2.4.4 Non-binding collateral constraint and binding incentive con-
straint
In this case, λ1 = 0. Then, σ ≤ 1 by (33), so there are illiquid mortgages that are not used as
collateral in the bank’s balance sheet. Then, from (31), (35), (37)-(39), and (46), we obtain
ψ = χ′(A∗), q = β, A = A∗, R = yυ′(yA∗), and l = l∗. Next, substituting binding incentive
constraint (23), (28)-(30) into (47), we obtain
(66) ρx1u
′(x1) + (1− ρ)x2u′(x2)− ku′(x2)− θβl∗ = V.
Then (52) and (66) solve for x1 and x2.
The non-binding collateral constraint (22) and the binding incentive constraint (23) re-
quire that σ(1− θ)βl∗ ≥ k. Thus,
(1− θ)βl∗ ≥ k
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must hold for this equilibrium to exist. In addition, positive λ2 implies x2 < x
∗ that requires,
from (52) and (66),
V < V + (1− θ)βl∗ − k.
Existence of equilibrium and the effects the fraud cost k From the previous four
subsections, we can construct Figure 6 that describes how the fraud cost k and fiscal policy
V together determine the existence of particular equilibria. In the figure, (CC) and (IC)
represent the bank’s collateral constraint and the incentive constraint, respectively, and k0
is obtained from V̂ (θ, k0) = 0.
As one can see from Figure 6, the incentive constraint tends to be non-binding with
higher V . In this economy, government debts act to discourage frauds in a following sense.
The bank cannot deceive depositors about its holdings of collateral government liabilities.
Thus, whenever the bank defaults on a deposit claim, the pledged government bonds and
reserves will also be confiscated. In this sense, government debts make default with fake
mortgages more costly, and as V increases, there are more government liabilities given θ.
Therefore, there is less incentive for banks to commit frauds. In particular, when both k and
V are sufficiently low, the incentive constraint binds but the collateral constraint does not
bind in equilibrium. In this case, there are illiquid mortgages in the bank’s balance sheet
that are not pledged as collateral. Thus, in principle, banks can post more mortgages to
secure their deposit liabilities, and hence the collateral constraint does not bind. However,
the incentive problem is so severe with low k and V that banks cannot use those illiquid
mortgages as collateral to satisfy the incentive constraint.
How does the cost of fraud k affect real allocations and asset prices? In this economy,
the fraud cost k affects the economy through the bank’s incentive constraint. Thus, k only
matters when the incentive constraint binds.
First, consider an equilibrium in which the collateral constraint and incentive constraint
both bind. Because the left-hand side of (65) decreases with k, x1 and x2 must rise as k
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Figure 6: Equilibria with the cost of fraud k and the fiscal policy V
increases. Further, A = A˜ increases with k by (62), so R decreases with k while ψ, q, and l
increases with k (see subsection 4.3). The intuition is as follows. In this case, an increase in
k mitigates the incentive problem in the banking sector, so the demand for mortgages rises,
which lowers the mortgage interest rate. This, in turn, increases the demand for houses, the
price of housing, and housing construction. Then, the rental rate falls to clear the market.
Second, in an equilibrium where only the incentive constraint binds, an increase in k raises
x1 and x2 because the left-hand side of (66) is decreasing in k. However, all macro economic
variables related to houses, such as ψ, q, l, A, and R, are unaffected by the change of k
because mortgages are illiquid, at the margin, as argued in subsection 4.4.
The above analysis implies that the housing price weakly increases with the fraud cost
k that affects the usefulness of houses as collateral via the bank’s incentive structure. This
is quite different from what obtains in He et al. (2015) where they assume that agents
cannot pledge more than an exogenous fraction of their housing holdings as collateral. In
their model, when the borrowing constraint is tight, the housing price rises if houses become
more pledgeable. However, continued increases in pledgeability eventually cause the price go
back down to its fundamental value because higher pledgeability lowers the marginal value
of liquidity as it further relaxes borrowing constraint and ultimately renders the constraint
slack. In contrast, when we modeled the friction that limits a role for houses as collateral
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more explicitly, the housing price does not fall as the usefulness of houses as collateral
increases.
2.5 Monetary Policy
We have so far taken the nominal government bond price, z, and the fraction of mortgages
that the central bank is willing to purchase from private banks, θ, as given. Now that we
have a basic working knowledge on the model, we study the effects of conventional and un-
conventional monetary policies on the model economy: What impact does (un)conventional
monetary policy have on equilibrium quantities and prices? How does (un)conventional
monetary policy affect the equilibrium type in which the economy stays? What is optimal
(un)conventional monetary policy?
To set the stage for welfare analysis, we define the sum of expected utilities across agents
with equal weight as our welfare measure. Then, our welfare measure can be written as
(67) W = ρ [u(x1)− x1] + (1− ρ) [u(x2)− x2]− χ(A) + βυ(yA).
Note that we discounted the utility from housing service consumption because houses con-
structed current period provide housing services in the next CM and depreciate by 100%.
Given our welfare measure (67), the first best is obtained with x1 = x2 = x
∗ and A = A∗.
2.5.1 Conventional Monetary Policy
We first use our model to understand the effects of the central bank’s conventional monetary
policy. The effects of changing z on economic variables and welfare in equilibrium where
neither the collateral constraint nor the incentive constraint binds is straightforward. An
increase of z raises x1 and does not affect any other economic variables. Thus, raising z
improves welfare (67).
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In the following analysis, we focus on the effects of conventional monetary policy in the
other three types of equilibria. For this purpose, it will be convenient to rewrite the equations
(57), (65), and (66) in a general form as
(68) ρx1u
′(x1) + (1− ρ)x2u′(x2)− Γ(x2; θ, k) = V,
where Γ(x2; θ, k) has the following form depending on the equilibrium type;
(69) Γ(x2; θ, k) =

βu′(x2)l̂(x2)
(1− θ)βl˜u′(x2) + θk1−θ
ku′(x2) + θβl∗
with binding (CC) and non-binding (IC)
with binding (CC) and binding (IC)
with non-binding (CC) and binding (IC).
Given fiscal policy V and unconventional monetary policy θ, equation (68) describes the
menu for the central bank in terms of feasible equilibrium allocations (FEA) for consump-
tions in the DM , (x1, x2). Then, the central bank chooses equilibrium (x1, x2) among the
feasible equilibrium allocations by determining the nominal government bond price z. More
precisely, equation (68) describes a locus in (x1, x2) space, as depicted by the curve FEA in
Figure 7. Further, the locus in (x1, x2) determined by (52) can be described, for example, as
the line z = z1 with z1 < 1 in Figure 7. Then, x1 and x2 are determined by the intersection
of FEA and z = z1 in Figure 7 at point A.
46
Now, the effects of conventional monetary policy on consumptions in the DM in equi-
librium with inefficient non-currency transactions where x2 < x
∗ become clear from Figure
7. Suppose the central bank chooses a lower nominal interest rate, for example, pegs the
price of government bonds at z2 > z1. This central bank action does not move the FEA
locus in Figure 7. However, as z increases, the curve z = z1 shifts down to z = z2, moving
equilibrium consumption (x1, x2) from point A to point B in Figure 7. As a result, the
quantity of exchange in currency transactions x1 in the DM rises and the quantity of ex-
46Note that because of the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate, z ≤ 1, the central
bank cannot choose an allocation below the curve ZLB depicted in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Conventional monetary policy when the aggregate collateral is scarce and x2 < x
∗
changes in non-currency transactions x2 in the DM falls. This is because the central bank
raises z by purchasing government bonds for the exchange of currency through open market
operation, so there are less collateralizable assets for non-currency transactions and more
currency in the economy. Then, because there are less collateralizable government liabilities
for non-currency transaction with a higher z, the parameter space (k, V ) for equilibrium in
which the incentive constraint binds expands. More precisely, an increase of z shifts the line
V = V and the curve given by V̂ (θ, k) = V in Figure 6 upward.
The effects of conventional monetary policy on housing and mortgage markets depend
on whether the incentive constraint binds or not. First, if the incentive constraint does not
bind and only the collateral constraint binds, the mortgage price q, housing price ψ, housing
stock A, and mortgage outstanding l rise and rental rate R falls as the central bank raises z
(see subsection 4.2): Given that x2 falls as z increases, there is higher demand for mortgages
as collateral, which in turn increases the mortgage price, housing demand, housing price,
so sellers construct more houses in response. Then, the rental rate decreases via market
clearing.
However, conventional monetary policy does not affect ψ, q, l, A, and R when the bank’s
incentive constraint binds (see subsections 4.3 and 4.4). The intuition for this finding is
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as follows. When the incentive constraint binds, the fraud cost, k, limits the quantity of
mortgages that can be used as collateral similar to Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012). If the
bank were to acquire an additional unit of mortgages and pledge them as collateral, then the
depositor would not make a deposit contract (or withdraws initial deposit κ) because of the
counterfeiting possibility. In this sense, the mortgage is not perfectly liquid. Therefore, even
though the exchange in non-currency transactions x2 falls, it does not lead to higher demand
for mortgages by the bank. Thus, the channel through which conventional monetary policy
affects the housing market does not work well when the efficient banking intermediation is
disrupted by the financial friction in the form of moral hazard problem.
We close this subsection with the analysis of the optimality of conventional monetary
policy in equilibrium with inefficient non-currency transactions. In particular, we restrict
our attention to the optimality of the zero lower bound, i.e., z = 1, when it is feasible under
each type of equilibria.
Proposition 5 If the bank’s incentive constraint binds or if
(70) yÂ(x)Â′(x)u′(x)υ′′
(
yÂ(x)
)
≤ −u′′(x)υ′
(
Â(x)
) [
Â(x)− xÂ′(x)
]
where x solves xu′(x) − βl̂(x)u′(x) = V in equilibrium where the collateral constraint binds
and the incentive constraint does not bind, then z = 1 is optimal at least locally.
Proof. The proof is done by comparing the derivative of a level surface of the welfare
function defined by (67), ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
W
, and the derivative of the locus given by (68), ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
FEA
, both
evaluated at the zero lower bound. From (68), ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
FEA,z=1
= − ρ
1−ρ− 1
u′(x)+xu′′(x)
∂Γ
∂x2
where
∂Γ
∂x2
can be obtained from (69) for each type of equilibrium. First, in equilibria where the
incentive constraint binds, ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
W
= − ρ
1−ρ and
∂Γ
∂x2
< 0. Thus, ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
W
< ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
FEA
and z = 1
is locally optimal. Second, in an equilibrium where the collateral constraint binds and the
incentive constraint does not, ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
W
= − ρ
1−ρ− [χ′(Â(x))−βyυ′(yÂ(x))]Â′(x)
u′(x)−1
and ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
W
≤ ∂x2
∂x1
∣∣∣
FEA
if
and only if (70) holds.
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The main implication of proposition 3 is that when the incentive constraint binds, it is
optimal for the central bank to set the nominal interest rate to zero at least locally.47 On the
other hand, when the incentive problem in the banking sector does not matter, the central
bank should be more cautious about implementing zero nominal interest rate policy because
a low nominal interest rate causes a housing construction boom. In an equilibrium where
the collateral constraint binds and the incentive constraint does not bind, A = Â(x2) > A
∗,
and an increase of z raises A, aggravating the welfare loss from over-construction of houses.
Here, the optimality of the zero lower bound depends on the curvature of υ(·). In particular,
if υ′′(υ) = 0, then (70) is always satisfied so z = 1 is optimal at least locally.
2.5.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy
We now turn our focus to unconventional monetary policy in the form of mortgage purchases
keeping V and z constant, which is main goal of this paper. Under unconventional monetary
policy, the central bank decides the quantity of mortgage purchases by gearing θ.
Equilibria with unconventional monetary policy Before studying the effects of un-
conventional monetary policy on real allocations and welfare in our model economy, we first
show how the existence of each type of equilibrium depends on θ, which is also of interest to
policy makers.
Consider the case that k > βl∗. Then, it is clear, from Figure 6, that an equilibrium
with efficient non-currency transactions where x2 = x
∗ exists for any θ if V ≤ V . Next,
because V̂ (θ, k) decreases with θ, if V̂ (θ = 0, k) ≤ V < V , then the collateral constraint
binds and the incentive constraint does not bind in equilibrium for any θ. Finally, assume
that V < V̂ (θ = 0, k). Then, there exists θ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that V̂ (θ̂, k) = V , and there is an
equilibrium where: (i) both constraints bind for θ ∈ [0, θ̂), and (ii) the collateral constraint
47Though we could not prove global optimality of zero lower bound analytically, numerical simulations
show that whenever the conditions for z = 1 to be locally optimal are satisfied, zero lower bound is globally
optimal.
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binds and the incentive constraint does not bind for θ ∈ [θ̂, 1].
Next, suppose k ≤ βl∗, so there exists θ ∈ [0, 1) such that k = (1 − θ)βl∗. First, if
V + βl∗ − k ≤ V , an equilibrium with efficient non-currency transactions exists for any θ.
Second, if V ≤ V < V + βl∗ − k, there exists θ˜ ∈ (0, θ] such that V + (1 − θ˜)βl∗ − k = V .
Then, there exists an equilibrium where: (i) the collateral constraint does not bind and the
incentive constraint binds for θ ∈ [0, θ˜), and (ii) neither the collateral constraint nor the
incentive constraint binds for θ ∈ [θ˜, 1]. Finally, assume that V < V . Note, from (55), (56),
and (60), that lim
θ→θ
x̂ = x∗ and lim
θ→θ
l̂ = l∗. Thus, V̂ (θ, k) = V , and there exists θ̂ ∈ (θ, 1) such
that V̂ (θ̂, k) = V . Then, there is an equilibrium where; (i) the collateral constraint does not
bind and the incentive constraint binds for θ ∈ [0, θ]; (ii) both constraints bind for θ ∈ (θ, θ̂);
(iii) the collateral constraint binds and the incentive constraint does not bind for θ ∈ [θ̂, 1].
We can use the above analysis to construct Figure 8 that depicts how the parameter space
is subdivided with θ on the horizontal axis and V on the vertical axis. One implication is
that when the efficient non-currency transaction in the DM is not attainable with low V ,
then as the central bank increases mortgage purchases, the mortgage becomes more liquid
in the following sense: Illiquid (σ ≤ 1) → liquid but with restriction on the quantity that
can be pledged as collateral (σ = 1 with the binding incentive constraint) → liquid without
any restriction (non-binding incentive constraint). In particular, there exists a threshold
level of θ, denoted by θ̂ < 1, such that if the central bank purchases more than θ̂ fraction of
mortgages in the economy, the bank’s faking incentive does not matter so the mortgage can
be pledged as collateral without any restriction. This is because as θ increases, banks post
more government bonds and reserves and less mortgages as collateral, which mitigates the
incentive for banks to commit frauds as argued in the previous section.
Effects of unconventional monetary policy in each equilibrium We now study
how unconventional monetary policy θ affects equilibrium quantities, prices, and welfare in
our model economy. Unlike conventional monetary policy, QE has no efficacy on macro-
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Figure 8: Equilibria with unconventional monetary policy θ and fiscal policy V
economic variables and hence welfare when the bank’s incentive constraint does not bind. In
the following, we focus on the effects of increasing θ in equilibrium where the bank’s incentive
constraint binds.
Consider the easy case, first, where only the incentive constraint binds and the collateral
constraint does not. From (69), we obtain that
∂Γ(x2; θ, k)
∂θ
= βl∗ > 0.
Thus, as θ increases, the curve FEA in Figure 7 that describes equation (68) shifts to the
right while the curve z = z1 stays fixed. As a result, x1 and x2 rise in equilibrium. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. In this case, QE affects the economy only through
the binding incentive constraint because the collateral constraint is slack. Then, as argued
above, the central bank’s mortgage purchases for the exchange of reserves always relax the
binding incentive constraint which increases exchanges in the DM . Further, given that the
mortgage is still illiquid at the margin in this equilibrium, its price should be fixed at its
fundamental value and hence the housing price, housing stock, and mortgage outstanding
75
are unaffected by unconventional monetary policy.
Next, consider an equilibrium where the collateral constraint and the incentive constraint
both bind. By taking derivative Γ(x2; θ, k) in (69) with respect to θ, we get
(71)
∂Γ(x2; θ, k)
∂θ
= −βl˜u′(x2) + k
(1− θ)2 + (1− θ)βu
′(x2)
∂l˜
∂θ
.
Here, the sign of ∂Γ(x2;θ,k)
∂θ
is not clear. In particular, ∂Γ(x2;θ,k)
∂θ
could be negative, which
implies that an increase of θ moves down FEA curve and exchanges in the DM , (x1, x2),
fall.
The intuition is in line with our earlier observations. In an equilibrium where the col-
lateral constraint and the incentive constraint both bind, θ affects exchanges in the DM
via these two binding constraints. Now suppose that the central bank purchases additional
one unit of mortgages for the exchange of reserves. On the one hand, given rate of return
difference between mortgages and reserves, this balanced budget mortgage purchase tightens
the collateral constraint (22), which forces x2 to fall.
48 On the other hand, this policy always
relaxes the bank’s incentive constraint (23), which forces x2 to rise. The first two terms in
(71) are related to these two effects of an increase of θ. Finally, central bank’s mortgage
purchases induce more production of houses in private sector, which will be explained below.
This, in turn, provides more collateralizable assets to the economy, and the last term in (71)
captures this effect.
Unlike from the case where only the incentive constraint binds, changing θ has impact on
the housing market in this case. In particular, ψ, q, A, and l increase while R decreases with
θ (see subsection 4.3). The intuition is as follows. In this equilibrium, the liquidity premium
on the mortgage price depends on the intensity of the incentive problem in the banking
sector, and an increase of θ mitigates the incentive problem as argued above. Thus, as θ
48More precisely, the central bank can purchase one unit of mortgage for the exchange of qzφt units of
reserves. Here, one unit of mortgage can secure one unit of deposit claims while qzφt units of reserves can
secure qzµ =
1
λ2+1
units of deposit claims that are less than one because λ2 > 0.
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increases, the demand for mortgages increases, which raises the mortgage price. Then, the
housing price and housing construction increase and the rental rate falls by market clearing
conditions.
How does an increase of θ affect the yield spread between government bonds and mort-
gages, µ
q
− 1
z
? First, when the incentive constraint does not bind, q = zµ (see subsections
4.1 and 4.2). Therefore, there is no yield spread, and changing θ has no effect on the yield
spread. Second, if both the collateral and incentive constraints bind, then from (29)-(31)
with σb = σ = 1, the yield spread is µ
q
− 1
z
= 1
z
{
βu′(x2)
q˜
− 1
}
. Because ∂q˜
∂θ
> 0, if x2 rises as
θ increases, then the spread must fall as the central bank purchases more mortgages. Now
suppose x2 falls. Substituting the equilibrium condition k = (1− θ)ql into (65), we obtain
(72) ρx1u
′(x1) + (1− ρ)x2u′(x2)− θk
1− θ = k
βu′(x2)
q
− V.
Because the left hand side of (72) decreases with θ given the assumption that ∂x2
∂θ
< 0, βu
′(x2)
q
decreases, so that the spread, µ
q
− 1
z
, must fall as θ increases. Finally, when the collateral
constraint does not bind and the incentive constraint binds, the yield spread is µ
q
− 1
z
= µ
β
− 1
z
.
In this case, an increase of θ lowers µ, so it reduces the yield spread. Therefore, our model
suggests that the central bank can lower the yield spread between government bonds and
mortgages with the mortgage purchase program when the incentive problem in the financial
sector generates the positive yield spread. This result is consistent with empirical evidences
on QE of Hancock and Passmore (2011).
We now study welfare implication of central bank’s mortgage purchases in equilibrium
with the binding incentive constraint. First, when only the incentive constraint binds, the
effects of increasing θ on welfare is straightforward: It raises (x1, x2) and A is fixed at A
∗.
Therefore, welfare given by (67) increases unambiguously. Second, in equilibrium where the
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Figure 9: Welfare and Central bank asset purchases
collateral constraint and the incentive constraint both bind, the effects of θ on welfare is
∂W
∂θ
=
 ρ [u
′(x1)− 1]X ′1(x2)
+(1− ρ) [u′(x2)− 1]
 dx2dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part 1 (+,−)
−
{
χ′
(
A˜
)
− βyυ′
(
yA˜
)} ∂A˜
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part 2 (+)
where X1(x2) = u
′−1
(
u′(x2)
z
)
.49 Thus, if dx2
dθ
≤ 0, then an increase of θ lowers welfare for
sure. If dx2
dθ
> 0, on the other hand, the sign of ∂W
∂θ
is ambiguous and depends on the
relative magnitudes of two counteracting effects: trade surplus from the increased exchanges
in the DM (part 1) and the welfare loss from the expanded residential investment above the
efficient level (part 2).
Figure 9 plots two examples illustrating the effects of the central bank’s mortgage pur-
chases on welfare depending on the fraud cost k.50 As one can see, welfare stays constant
at W =2.9989 for sufficiently high θ in both cases because the economy stays in equilibrium
with the non-binding incentive constraint once θ becomes higher than θ̂. However, the effects
of θ on welfare are remarkably different between two examples depending on k. On the one
49Given A˜ > A∗ and ∂A˜∂θ > 0, part 2 is positive.
50Functional forms to get the results are u(x) = u0x
1−γ
1−γ , υ(f) = υ0 log(f), and χ(A) = χ0A
ω. Parameter
values used are β = 0.95, γ = 0.6, u0 = χ0 = 1, υ0 = 0.4, ω = 2, y = 0.01, z = 1, and V = 0.55, and we used
k = 0.3804 for left panel and k = 0.2850 for right panel.
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hand, when k > βl∗, central bank’s mortgage purchases only lower welfare and θ = 0 (no
QE) is optimal.51 On the other hand, when k < βl∗, welfare increases with θ. Thus, it is
optimal for the central bank to purchase mortgages from private banks more than θ̂ fraction
of mortgages in the economy.52
QE with finite fraud cost kc < ∞ We close this section with the study of the model
economy where banks can make fake mortgages and sell them to the central bank at the
fixed cost kc ∈ (0,∞). Thus, the constraint (34), that can be rewritten as
(73) kc ≥ qθl,
must hold in equilibrium. However, this new incentive constraint does not affect our previous
results. Instead, it generates a upper bound for θ.
Consider equilibrium where q = β and l = l∗. Here, (73) requires θ ≤ kc
βl∗ ≡ θ1.
Next, in equilibrium where only the collateral constraint binds, (73) can be rewritten as
θ ≤ kc
βu′(x2)l̂(x2)
≡ θ2. Because x2 increases with V in this equilibrium, θ2 rises with V .
Finally, when both the collateral and incentive constraints bind, (73) becomes q˜θl˜ ≤ kc that
can be written as θ ≤ kc
k+kc
≡ θ3. Figure 10 illustrates above analysis.53 As one can see from
Figure 10, the possibility that private banks can make fake mortgages and sell them to the
central bank limits the quantity of mortgage purchases by the central bank.
51Of course, one can get different results with other parameter values. For example, it is possible that the
optimal mortgage purchases is θ ≥ θ̂ even though k > βl∗.
52In particular, numerical exercises show that optimal θ decreases with the fraud cost k ∈ (0, k) where
k satisfies V̂ (θ, k) = 0, which implies that the central bank needs to purchase more mortgages as financial
frictions become more severe.
53The left panel draw the case where θ3 < θ̂0 < θ1 < 1 and the right panel is the case where θ0 < θ3 <
θ̂0 < θ1 < 1. Depending on parameter values, in particular k and kc, there are many other cases. For
example, it is possible that θ1 > 1 or θ1 < θ0, etc.
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Figure 10: Equilibria with finite kc <∞
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a New Monetarist model characterized by an endogenous private
asset supply and an incentive to misrepresent the quality of private assets in the banking
sector. When the incentive problem matters, it limits the extent in which private assets
facilitate the exchange process. In this circumstance, QE in the form of central bank’s
private asset purchases from banks matters, in that it replaces private assets that are less
useful as a medium of exchange with government assets. However, the effects of the central
bank’s private asset purchase program depend on how severe the incentive problem is. When
the incentive to fake the quality of private assets is so high that some private assets cannot
be used as a medium of exchange, an increase of the size of central bank’s asset purchases
improves welfare unambiguously. However, when the incentive problem is not so severe but
still matters, it is possible that the central bank’s private asset purchases only lower welfare.
Thus, in some cases with weak financial frictions, it would be suboptimal for the central
bank to engage in a private asset purchase program.
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